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CHAnElU
INTRODUCTIOIS
The concern for oil and hazardous substance spills and
contaminated sites as a national concern grew slowly until the
National Oil Pollution Act was passed in 1924. Later, in 1954,
this concern began to quicken in pace and take on an
international flavor with the 1954 convention for Prevention of
Pollution of the Sea by Oil. Between 1954 and 1968 there was the
1962 Amending Convention and other international recognitions of
the problem, but in September 1968 the united States formulated
the first National Contingency Plan. The National Oil and
Hazardous Substance Contingency Plan dated July 16, 1982 as
amended is the current NCP and, while it evolved form an
interagency agreement to a guideline at 33 CFR Part 1510, it
today is published as law at 40 CFR Part 300.
Between 1965 and 1972 a number of landmark occurrences developed
which, whether related of not, underscore how environmental
concerns moved quickly into the 1970s and grew to profound
proportions by the early 1980s. Oil and hazardous substance
pollution was a large part of this phenomenon.
In 1965 the Federal Water Pollution Control Administration, later
renamed the Federal Water Quality Administration, was formulated
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in the Department of Interior. In 1965 the National Water
quality Act was passed.
In 1967 the tragic grounding of the Torrey Canyon occurred,
followed by the Santa Barbara seep, the Ocean Eagle sinking, the
two well blowouts in the Gulf of Mexico and the Delane Apollo in
Tampa, Florida, all of which heightened pUblic sensitivity to
massive oil spills.
In 1970 the Water Quality Improvement Act of 1970 was passed and
the Environmental Protection Agency was formed. In 1972 the
Clean Water Act (actually the Federal Water Pollution Control
Act) was passed. This edition of the basic 1956 Federal Water
Pollution Control Act, added the $20,000,000.00 "section K Fund."
Tagging along in name if not in substantive law were the
hazardous substance events. National recognition of the
hazardous substance problem was stimulated more by the discovery
of huge abandoned sites of buried, stored, of lagooned chemical
wastes than by spill-type events. Such discoveries as "Love
Canal" and the "Valley of the Drums" in the late 1970s helped
Congress to merge the cleanup and mitigation of damages from both
sites and spills into what we now know as "Superfund." Many
governmental agencies including the u.S. Navy have their own
horror stories. The Navy is working with federal and state
agencies in testing solutions for the cleanup of past and present
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hazardous waste sites. Naval Education and Training Center
(NETC) was shocked to find out it had 18 past hazardous waste
sites. Superfund is a nickname for the Comprehensive
Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability Act of 1980
(CERCLA). Naval installations are still going through growing
pains when it comes to implementing some of the more recent
environmental laws of the past decade such as CERCLA and RCRA.
In December of 1980, the president signed the "Superfund"
legislation. This very complex federal law basically left the
oil spill sections of the Clean Water Act intact and placed all
hazardous substance regulation under a new concept of management.
This new concept placed a new burden on EPA; that of being the
custodian of a 1.6 billion dollar clean-up fund. The EPA began
by publishing a new NCP under 40 CFR Part 300. 1 This new plan
was developed largely by the EPA and no longer is a guideline but
is published as law. Not only does it address oil and hazardous
substance spills but uncontrolled hazardous waste sites as well.
In 1986 it was amended to include provisions for state/local
planning and community right to know, and increase the clean up
fund to about nine billion dollars.
My intention in this paper is to focus on the "chronic" hazardous
waste problem steming from past disposal/storage practices. More
International Technology corporation, Knoxville, TN
37923; Hazardous Substance Incident Response Management Course
book, 1991; page 2-2.
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specifically, to focus on two underground storage tanks at NETC
which were used for the storage of hazardous waste (waste oil
tanks). It is now common knowledge that old underground storage
tanks throughout the country present a potential ground water
contamination hazard which must be dealt with. This
contamination is commonly caused when the metal tank rusts
thereby releasing its contents into the surrounding ground water.
It is common for relatively smaller tanks to be made of metal,
such as the type used at auto service stations. However, large
underground storage tanks of 60,000 barrels or more were normally
constructed of concrete. These tanks pose a potential leak
hazard from cracks developed in the concrete joints and more
commonly from overflow by infiltration of surface and ground
water through cracks in the overhead which causes the oily
contents to float on the water and overflow. The potential for
spills is also present during the numerous transfer operations.
Most naval installations store bulk quantities of fuels. The
need for storing fuels is obvious especially at naval
installations. They use it for everything from powering ships to
powering generators and as a heating fuel. Over the past decade
naval installations have heightened their awareness of
environmental responsibilities and implemented recycling programs
for the disposable of paper, glass, etc. and have even
established programs for fuel collection and recycling for
heating plants. It is for these reasons that many naval bases
are presently where NETC was a decade ago. That is, they have
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found themselves in posess ion of old fuel tanks which over the
years have been converted to oily waste tanks for recycling which
now require permits from the host state. Upon inspection the
tanks are found to leak into the surrounding ground water posing
a health risk to the local population. Complicating the matter
is the fact that most navy tanks were intentionally located in
the coastal zone for easy transfer operations from and to ships.
The close siting to coastal waters obviously increases the human
health risk.
RESOURCE CONSERVATION AND RECOVERY ACT
The Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA) became law in
1976. EPA developed implementing regUlations in 1980 and
continues to add new regulations and revise existing rules. RCRA
authorizes EPA to regulate the generation, transportation, and
disposal of "hazardous wastes." virtually all states including
Rhode Island have promulgated rules "authorized" by the EPA for
the handling of hazardous waste. In these cases the state rules
take precedence over the federal rules. The navy and in this
specific case the Naval Education and Training Center of Newport
RI is currently paying the price for past hazardous waste
mistakes. In the past, the navy and the pUblic was ignorant of
environmental issues. As awareness grew in the public arena, the
attitude of navy leadership was slow to change from one of
cavalier disregard for environmental regUlations. The new
regUlations were viewed as interference from environmental "do
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gooders" who had no idea of the time and expense required to
comply. There was no incentive nor mechanism for change. When
attitudes finally did change the navy woke up to the realization
that not only was there a massive problem with past hazardous
sites which needed to be dealt with but the navy had to implement
a new training program to educate its personnel concerning
hazardous waste practices or face personal liability. Presently
NETC is proactive concerning training its personnel regarding
hazardous waste. In fact, the hazardous waste branch of the
Public Works Department at NETC is the only area at NETC which is
expanding in terms of the number of personnel.
The navy at NETC signed an official agreement with u.s. EPA and
the Sate of Rhode Island in March of 1992 to coordinate with EPA
and the State to correct past hazardous waste problems and
specifically to:
"Consult and coordinate with EPA and the State regarding
testing and closure of underground storage tanks pursuant to
applicable law; and, consult and coordinate with EPA and the
State regarding groundwater monitoring and remediation based
on the results of the Phase I RI activities of Tank Farm
Five, for Tanks 53 and 56, pursuant to applicable law.,,2
The above agreement has been waiting for nearly 10 years. Part
2 Federal Facility Agreement Under CERCLA #120 in the
matter of Naval Education and Training Center (NETC) Newport RI;
signed March 1992. Signatory parties includ: USEPA Region 1, the
state of Rhode Island, and U.S. Department of the Navy; page 21.
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of the problem of the long delay in remediating3 Tanks 53 and 56
at Tank Farm Five stems from a slow start caused by the attitude
described above. Other contributing causes stem from a learning
curve which affects all new programs and regulations. And
finally the infighting present between all parties slowed the
process. Tanks 53 and 56 at NETC are important because a similar
situation will most certainly arise at other bases throughout the
navy. An analysis of the problems encountered here will save
taxpayer money by using techniques learned by trial and error at
NETC.
To fully understand the issue of storing oil one must understand
how the term is used under the law. RCRA defines "storage," as
opposed to "accumulation", as holding hazardous wastes on site
for more than 90 days. Permits are required for storage. The
u.s. Navy is routinely involved in obtaining permits from host
states throughout the country for the storage of hazardous wastes
at naval installations. Of importance is the regulatory
distinction made between the storage of "product" oil and the
storage of "waste" oil. When oil is classified as "waste" oil,
its handling is then governed by CERCLA and RCRA. However, when
oil is stored simply as "product" oil, RCRA does not apply. For
example, heating oil is considered product oil; however, if it
3 Remediation in this context of underground storage
tanks is the process of: removing the waste oil from the tanks,
cleaning the tanks, remediating the ground water, demolishing the
tanks, and backfilling the area.
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has been recycled from other uses and is being stored for re-use
as a heating oil, it is then considered waste oil (presumably
because of the probability of higher concentrations of
contaminants). It is the task of the base commander and his
hazardous waste advisers to sort out the applicable governing
regulations and comply accordingly.
The act of disposing of hazardous wastes is tightly regulated by
RCRA. Essentially these rules forbid disposal except at fully
permitted sites. Today, navy installations are not normally in
the business of "storing" and "disposing" of hazardous waste on
the same base. Normally, a base commander will obtain a
hazardous waste storage permit to store the waste for a period of
greater than 90 days at an authorized site on board the base.
The actual disposal of the waste is completed by transporting the
waste off base to a civilian disposal site incurring a monetary
cost to the base commander. There is a financial incentive for
the base commander to recycle. During the early 80s bases
recycled fuels on board by holding recycled fuel in convenient
underground fuel storage tanks designed to hold fuels. with the
advent of RCRA and as a greater understanding of the constituents
of the recycled fuels grew it was reclassified as hazardous
waste. The associated burden of complying with RCRA and the
financial incentive to sell recyclable fuels to the civilian
business community prompted base commanders to make the decision
to get out of the "on board fuel recycling business." It is the
8
problems encountered during the process of getting out of the on
board fuel/hazardous waste storage business by the navy and
specifically Naval Education and Training Center (NETC) Newport
RI which is documented and analyzed in this paper.
The problem as I see it is the excessive delay and re-invention
of the "wheel" concerning the discontinuation of storage of
hazardous waste oil. It has been more than a decade since NETC
made the decision to abandon the use of two 60,000 barrel
underground storage tanks (specifically Tanks 53 and 56 at Tank
Farm Five). To this day the contaminated ground water has not
been remediated nor have the tanks been demolished and backfilled
as planned. This paper will investigate the process and
decisions made and conclude with recommendations for future
similar situations at other navy bases.
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CHAPfER2
NETe, NEWPORT RI SITE HISTORY
NETC Newport is comprised of 1,400 acres of land and is spread
out along approximately six miles of the western shoreline of
Aquidneck Island. It is located north of Newport, Rhode Island
on the west shore of Aquidneck Island facing the east passage of
Narragansett Bay. NETC Newport is approximately 60 miles south
of Boston, MA and 25 miles southeast of Providence, Rhode Island.
Block Island Sound and the Atlantic Ocean are approximately 12
miles south of the NETC Newport naval complex. Portions of NETC
Newport lie within the City of Newport and the Towns of
Middletown and Portsmouth (see figure 1).
The Navy's first permanent activity at NETC Newport was in 1869
when the experimental Torpedo station at Goat Island was
established. In 1881, Coasters Harbor Island was acquired by the
Navy and used for training purposes. In 1900 the Navy purchased
160 acres of land and constructed the Narragansett Bay Coal
Depot. In 1910 four fuel oil tanks4 were added in the Melville
area. Some of these tanks are still in use today.
4 FEDERAL FACILITY AGREEMENT UNDER CERCLA #120. signed
23 March 1992 by representatives from: U.S. DEPT. OF THE NAVY;
U.S. EPA; THE STATE OF RHODE ISLAND. Page 12.
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The outbreak of World War I brought a significant increase in
military activity at Newport and two additional fuel oil tanksS
were constructed.
In 1941 the Navy constructed five tank farms containing a total
of 47 tanks6 to store fuel oils and other petroleum products with
a total storage capacity of 2.8 million barrels. All of the
tanks are concrete with the exception of two steel tanks in Tank
Farm #3.
In April 1973, the Shore Establishment Realignment Program (SER)
was announced and resulted in the largest reorganization of naval
forces in the Newport area. The Public Works Center, Naval
Supply Center, Naval station and Naval Base were reorganized
under the Naval Officer Training Center (NOTC). In April 1974,
NOTC was changed to the Naval Education Training Center Newport.
The reorganization resulted in the Navy excessing a portion of
the base.
NETC Newport is currently under the command of, and receives
primary support from, the Chief of Naval Education and Training
in Pensacola, Florida and is currently the Navy's largest officer
training facility. In 1980 the Department of the Navy developed
the Navy Assessment and Control of Installation Pollutants
S Ibid.
6 Ibid.
12
(NACIP) to identify and control environmental contaminants from
past use and disposal of Hazardous Substances at Naval
installations. The program was to be managed in three phases:
* Phase I - Initial Assessment Study (lAS) - identifies
potential threats to human health or to the environment
caused by past hazardous substance storage, handling or
disposal practices at naval activities.
* Phase II - Confirmation Study - analyzes contaminants
present at sites of concern and determines their
migration paths.
* Phase III - Remedial Action - requires corrective
measures to mitigate or eliminate confirmed problems.
It is not until phase III that the problem is actually
corrected. Phase III could be delayed for years
awaiting completion of the initial phases.
A Phase I lAS study was concluded at NETC Newport in March 1983
by Envirodyne Engineers, Inc. (EEl). It included a review of
archival and activity records, interviews with activity
personnel, an on-site survey of the activity, and an off-site
activity investigation. A copy was forwarded to and received by
EPA on 1 October 1984. The lAS report identified a total of 18
potentially contaminated areas. The areas identified are as
follows: 7
7 Ibid., page 13.
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Area 1 McAllister Point Landfill
Area 2 Melville North Landfill
Area 3 Substation #14 - Transformer Vault
Area 4 Coddington Cove Rubble fill
Area 5 Melville North Area
Area 6 STP Sludge Drying Bed
Area 7 Tank Farm One
Area 8 NUWC (formerly Naval Underwater Systems Center (NUSC) )
Disposal Area
Area 9 fire fighting Training Area
Area 10 Tank Farm Two
Area 11 Tank Farm Three
Area 12 Tank Farm Four
Area 13 Tank Farm Five
Area 14 Gould Island Disposal Area
Area 15 Gould Island Bunker 11
Area 16 Gould Island Incinerator
Area 17 Gould Island Electroplating Shop
Area 18 Structure 214 - Melville North Area
As discussed in the introduction, the focus of this paper is
Tanks 53 and 56 of Tank Farm Five, Area 13. Tank Farm Five is
unique because unlike the other tank farms, Tank Farm Five
contained two tanks (#53 & #56) which were changed in the late
70s from "product" storage tanks to "waste oil" storage tanks.
In doing so, these tanks became SUbject to RI hazardous waste
14
storage regulations. As a result, more regulations of regulatory
agensies must be complied with making the clean-up procedures
much more involved, complicated and sometimes contradictory for
Tanks 53 and 56.
The Defense Environmental restoration Program (DERP) was
established in 1984 to promote and coordinate efforts for the
evaluation and cleanup of contamination at DoD installations.
The Program currently consists of three major elements including:
A. The Installation Restoration Program (IRP)- where potential
contamination at DoD installations and formerly used
properties is investigated and, as necessary, site cleanups
are conducted. The IRP provides for compliance with the
procedural and substantive requirements of CERCLA, as
amended by SARA, as well as regulations promulgated under
these acts or by Applicable State Law and is managed in four
phases. NETC is currently in phase 3 (Remedial
Investigation/Feasibility Study) of the IRP. The four
phases of the IRP are described below:
1. Preliminary Assessment (PA) - An initial analysis of
existing information to determine if a site requires
additional investigation or action;
2. site Inspection (SI) - To augment data collected during
the PA and to generate, if necessary, sampling and
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other field data to determine if further action or
investigation is appropriate;
3. Remedial Investigation/Feasibility study (RI/FS) - An
extensive technical study conducted to determine the
nature and extent of the threat or potential threat
posed by the release of hazardous material and
determine what action, if any, should be taken to
remediate the site; and
4. Remedial Design/Remedial Action (RD/RA) - RD is the
translating of the FS into designs and specifications
for site remediation. RA is the physical
implementation of site remediation.
B. other Hazardous Waste (OHW) operations, through which
research, development and demonstration programs aimed at
reducing 000 hazardous waste generation rates are conducted.
C. Building Demolition and Debris Removal (BD/DR) - The third
element of DOD's DERP includes demolition and removal of
unsafe buildings or structures.
Tank Farm Five is one of four sites currently being investigated
under the third phase Remedial Investigation/Feasibility study
(RI/FS) of the Installation Restoration Program (IRP). In March
1989 an RI/FS Work Plan was proposed by the Navy with final
approval by EPA of a revised plan expected soon.
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The chronology of the remediation of contaminated tanks, soil and
ground water at Tank Farm Five follows two concurrent tracks
because of the two regulatory agencies involved in the process.
One can trace the clean up efforts of contaminated sites at NETC
as these activities relate to the DoD's DERP program discussed
above. More specifically, the IRP which supports CERCLA is a
holistic clean up approach which initially investigates all areas
of past contamination at a Federal installation. As noted above,
NETC contained several such Areas Of contamination (AOCs) which
were investigated under the IRP program. All investigation and
remediation practices under this program is overseen by the
USEPA.
Tank Farm Five however, was also sUbject to RI RCRA rules in
addition to CERCLA because it contained two tanks (#53 & #56)
which were recently used for hazardous waste oil storage which
therefore subjected them to RI RCRA and in addition the tanks are
specifically addressed in NETC's hazardous waste permit which is
regulated by RI RCRA. Because of the dual nature of Federal and
state agencies involved in Tank Farm Five there is essentially
two clean up tracks or plans which have sometimes paralleled each
other and at other times opposed each other slowing the whole
process.
Pursuant to 10 U.S.C. 2705(c), a technical Review Committee (TRC)
17
was convened on April 6, 19888 to facilitate communication of
information with regard to Response Actions to be undertaken at
NETC Newport. Committee members meet periodically to review
technical data, Remedial Investigation reports, work plans,
funding status and Timetables for field work, and other documents
relating to the Response Actions at NETC Newport. Membership on
the TRC includes representatives from the U.S. Navy, the U.S. EPA
- Region I, the state of Rhode Island Department of Environmental
Management (RIDEM), representatives from the city of Newport, the
Towns of Portsmouth and Middletown, and local citizen's groups.
On July 14, 1989, the EPA proposed adding NETC Newport to the
National Priorities List (NPL) (54 FR 29820), and on November 21,
1989, NETC Newport was listed on the NPL (54 FR 48184}.9
In June 1990, the Navy established PUblic Information
Repositories for documents relating to NETC Newport Response
Actions. The Repositories are located at the Towns of Newport,
Middletown, and Portsmouth libraries.
As of the writing of this paper, there are four Areas of
contamination (AOCs) (see figure two) which have been identified
as follows:
8
9
Ibid., page 17.
Ibid.
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As discussed earlier, while various AOCs at NETC were being
investigated, Tank Farm Five (AOC 13) was also proceeding on a
separate track under RCRA because Tanks 53 and 56 were classified
as waste storage tanks. On September 10, 1986, NETC was issued a
Rhode Island Department of Environmental Management Hazardous
Waste facility Permit #RIl170024243 which stipulated that Tanks
53 and 56 at Tank Farm Five must be closed by CY 1988.
On February 12, 1988, NETC Newport was listed on the Federal
Agency Hazardous Waste compliance Docket which was established
pursuant to CERCLA #120(c). The remaining areas of the original
18 have been either identified as a Study Area (SA) or have since
been excessed by the Navy. These excessed areas are known as
Formerly-Used Defense Sites (FUDS).
In a March 1992 Federal Facilities Agreement signed in Newport,
RI, the Navy, EPA, and RIDEM agreed to the below schedule for the
clean-up of Areas of contamination (AOC) based on the Navy's
March 1989 RIfFS Work Plan submitted to EPA and the State. The
below schedule refers to all AOC's at NETC including Tank Farm
20
Five. 10
RIfFS Work Plan
community Relations Plan
Phase I RI Report
Phase II RI Work Plan
Phase II RI Report
RIfFS Report,
Phase II RI
Proposed Plan,
Phase II RI
Record of decision (ROD)
(describes the Remedial Action
alternative(s) selected to be
implemented)
March 1989
July 1990
November 18,1991
July 30,1992
September 1, 1993
July 30, 1994
March 15, 1995
November 15, 1995
Of note is that the above list does not include the actual
remedial action which would come after the Record of Decision
(ROD) which is the last entry on the schedule. The RIDEM
remediation schedule for Tanks 53 and 56 is considerably faster
and less complicated. The specifics of the RIDEM remediation
schedule will be discussed in chronological detail in the
following chapters.
10 Ibid., page 45.
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DEFENSE FUEL SUPPORT POINT (DFSP), MELVILLE
The Defense Fuel Support Point is located at the north end of the
Newport naval complex. Its headquarters are located at Defense
Fuel supply Center (DFSC), Cameron station, Alexandria, Va., and
the regional office is located at Defense Fuel Supply Center
Region Office, McGuire Air Force Base, N.J.
The mission of the facility is to receive, store, and issue
various petroleum products to military and federal civilian
agencies, such as the Naval Education and Training center,
Newport; fleet units, Coast Guard units, General Electric
(government contract work), and various Air Force Bases and Naval
Air stations. DFSC operates the facility as a government-owned,
contractor-operated DFSP, with a small number of government
employees monitoring contractor operation of the facility.
The following real property and equipment at DFSP, Melville, are
maintained by DFSC: 200 acres, three tank farms (33 tanks), one
deep water fuel pier, 25 miles of pipeline, 1,700 valves, and 100
steam and electric pumps. storage capacity of petroleum is
1,300,000 barrels. 1I There are 14 buildings, two of which are
occupied by government employees; three are occupied by
Management Engineering Associates employees.
11 Department of the Navy Rhode Island Area Annual Report
1991; page 49.
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NAVY FUELS
The U.S. Navy uses enormous quantities of petroleum products to
fuel and lubricate its vessels, vehicles, aircraft and stationary
power stations. The maintenance and repair of these units
requires a myriad of chemicals that are defined by the National
contingency Plan as "hazardous substances." The necessary
products are centrally procured in bulk quantities by the Defense
Fuel supply Center, Cameron Station, Alexandria, VA, to satisfy
Navy worldwide requirements. After inspection by Government
representatives, Navy products are delivered from refineries by
tanker, pipeline, rail or truck.
In addition to the bulk fuels, the Department of Defense
purchases bulk quantities of three commonly used Navy lUbricating
oils. The lubes are used for aircraft and diesel engines and
ships' machinery. These bulk lubricating oils are normally
delivered directly to naval vessels by tank truck at pier side.
In the storage and handling of the quantities and variety of oil
and hazardous substances used by the Navy, spills, leaks and
other accidental releases are inevitable.
Fuel oils - The Navy uses several types of fuel oil:
Diesel Fuel oils: Three grades of diesel fuel oils are
purchased for use in automotive diesel engines. These fuel
grades, OF-A, DF-1, and DF-2, range in viscosity from 1.2 to 4.3
23
centistokes at 100 0 F and have flash points of 100 0 F or
greater. 12 DF-A is an arctic grade fuel for cold temperature use,
DF-1 for use in continental United states locations with low
temperatures in the winter seasons and DF-2 for summer use and
moderate ambient temperatures.
Naval Distillate Fuel (NDF): Another diesel fuel consumed by
the Navy; NDF is used principally on Navy vessels. NDF was
formerly called Diesel Fuel Marine (DFM), which replaced both
Navy Special and Navy Distillate fuels. This low viscosity
liquid will spread rapidly over any surface onto which it is
spilled.
Burner Fuel oils: The second principal type of fuel oils used
by the Navy are the "Burner fuel oils" used for heat and power
generation. The waste oil tanks referred to in this paper were
used to store burner fuel oils used in heating buildings at NETC
in addition to other waste oils. These oils are numerically
graded 1 through 6; No. 3 is no longer used. Grades No.1 and No.
2 are distillate or "light end" fractions with maximum
viscosities in the range of 2.2 to 3.6 centistokes at 100 0 F,
flash point minimum to 100 0 F and specific gravity of
approximately 0.85. 13 Generally No. 1 is used in space heaters
12 Oil and Hazardous Substance (OHS) spill Planning for
NOSCs and NOSCDRs (DRAFT); Prepared by: En Safe Environmental
and Safety Designs, Inc. Memphis, TN; 1-6.
13 Ibid.
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and No. 2 for residential heating.
The other extreme of burner fuel grades is the very viscous No.6
fuel oil. This residual oil, also known as Bunker C, is used in
many commercial ships and shore station power plants. This oil
has a flash point of 150 0 F and viscosity in the range of 92 to
638 centistokes at 122 0 F. w It must be heated prior to use to
facilitate handling.
No. 4 oil is rarely used, though it is available as light
residual or heavy distillate cuts. No. 5 burner fuel is also
available in light and heavy cuts of the residual oil fraction.
Heavy residual (NO.5) has a viscosity range of 75 to 162
centistokes at 100 0 F and a flash point of 130 0 Fis reflecting
the intermediate characteristics of this fuel oil.
Navy oil spills and Regulations
The various petroleum products used by the Navy are delivered to
Naval activities by pipeline, tanker, barge, rail car, or highway
truck. The potential for spilling these products is inherent in
their transportation, handling, and the transfer operations
associated with storage and dispensing. OPNAVINST 5090.1A
requires that all Navy-related oil spills must be reported to the
Navy Energy and Environmental support Activity (NEESA). An
IS
Ibid., page 1-7.
Ibid.
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analysis of the reports generated in this overall Navy monitoring
operation has been made by NEESA in "Naval oil Spills Annual
Report." Public law, the Code of Federal Regulations, and
various Department of Defense instructions regulate oil spills on
shore facilities. The Clean Water Act prohibits the discharge of
oil from any waterborne vessel or from any onshore or offshore
facility into or upon the navigable waters of the united states
within the 12 nautical mile contiguous zone. Title 40, Code of
Federal Regulations, Part 110 (40 CFR 110), prohibits discharges
from shore facilities and vessels which cause a visible sheen to
any waters of the United states. The Environmental Protection
and Natural Resources Manual, (OPNAVINST 5090.1A of 2 October
1990)16 is a Navy pUblication which provides guidance of
implementation of Federal laws and regulations as they apply to
Naval operations.
Ibid., page 1-1.
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CHAPTER 3
TANK FARM FIVE
Tank Farm Five is located approximately one mile north of NETC in
the town of Middletown, RI. Tank farm Five is bordered to the
north and northwest by Defense Highway, to the southwest by a
cemetery, to the east by residences and to the north and
northeast by Greene's Lane and Gomes Brook. Tanks 53 and 56 are
located in the western portion of the 85-acre tank farm (see
figure 3).
Eleven underground storage tanks, numbered 49 through 59,
comprise Tank Farm Five. Each tank is constructed of prestressed
concrete and has a capacity of 60, 000 barrels .17 The tanks were
constructed in 1942 and 1943. The tanks are approximately 116
feet in diameter and 33.5 feet deep. The tanks are covered by
approximately 4 feet of soil. Each tank is surrounded by a ring
drain area which consists of 12 inch reinforced concrete drain
pipe located within a permeable back fill approximately 4 feet
wide. The drain is connected to a sump pump to remove the ground
water from the back fill area, reportedly to prevent tank
drainage or tank flotation.
17 Tank Closure Plan for Tanks 53 and 56, Tank Farm Five,
Naval Education and Training Center Newport, RI. Prepared by:
Environmental Resource Associates, Inc. Warwick, RI. April 15,
1988; page 2.
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NEWPORT, RI
The underground storage tanks in Tank Farm Five were used for
fuel storage from World War II to 1974. In 1975, the Navy began
using Tanks 53 and 56 for used oil storage as part of an oil
recovery program. Between 1975 and 1982, Tanks 53 and 56 were
utilized to contain used oil for alternate use as heating fuel
for Building 8618 • In 1982, the state of Rhode Island Department
of Environmental Management (RIDEM) adopted hazardous waste
regulations which were applicable to the waste or used oils in
tanks 53 and 56. In 1984, the Navy decided to discontinue use of
the tanks. In 1986 NETC was issued a hazardous waste permit for
another site not related to Tanks 53 and 56. However, a
condition of the permit stipulated that NETC was to close the
tanks in calendar year 1988. In 1988, a tank closure plan
addressing Tanks 53 and 56 was prepared for the Navy by
Environmental Resource associates, Inc. By definition tank
closure includes: removal and disposal of the tank's contents,
cleaning of the tank walls, and demolition. The current status
of Tanks 53 and 56 is as follows: the contents of Tanks 53 and 56
have been decontaminated and removed, and the Tank walls steam
cleaned and decontaminated. The Tanks have yet to be demolished
and back filled.
History of Investigations
Sampling of the water, oil, and sludge in Tanks 53 and 56 was
18 Ibid.
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conducted in 1983 by Environmental Resources Associates, Inc. 19
The presence of three phases in the tanks was a result of the
tanks being filled with water for ballast after their use was
discontinued. According the ERA report, the sample analyses
results indicated that the oil phase in both tanks was determined
to be hazardous due to the concentration of lead in the oil.
Similarly, the sludge layer in both tanks was also determined to
be hazardous by ERA due to the presence of significant
concentrations of lead, cadmium, chromium, barium, mercury and
silver. 20 In addition, the water in Tank 56 was found to contain
hydrocarbon compounds.
In 1985, a total of four ground water monitor wells (MW-53E, MW-
53W, MW-56E, and MW-56W) were installed in the ring drains of
Tanks 53 and 56. The ERA ground water sample results indicated
the presence of several chlorinated and aromatic hydrocarbons in
the samples from wells in the Tank 53 ring drain. 21 In addition,
trace concentrations of mercury were detected in wells in both
tank ring drains. Cadmium was also detected in one ground water
sample from the ring drain of Tank 56. No other metals were
detected in the ground water samples from the four wells. Split
Ibid., page 3.
Ibid.
21 The resuls of ground water sample analyses are
summarized in tables 1 through 4 from the Environmental Resouce
Associates (ERA), Inc. Warwick, RI Tank Closure Plan; 15 April
1988.
30
spoon soil samples collected from the Tank 53 ring drain borings
showed fuel oil staining and odor. n
six additional monitor wells were installed around the tanks and
sampled by ERA in 1986; five to the north and west of Tank 53 and
one 300 feet south of Tank 56. 23 The analytical results of the
ground water samples from their wells confirmed the presence of
organic compounds in the Tank 53 ring drain. The sample results
also indicated the presence of organic compounds in the ground
water at a distance of 150 feet to the north of Tank 53. At the
time of sampling, a floating oil layer was present in the Tank 53
ring drain wells. The hydraulic gradient data developed for the
well network indicated a ground water flow direction to the
northwest across Tank 53 and a downward vertical hydraulic
gradient at a nested well pair installed to the northwest of Tank
53. Basically, the tanks are situated on the slope of a hill
which continues down in a northwest direction to the east passage
of Narragansett Bay.
In 1986, the four ring drain monitor wells were resampled by
ERA.~ The results of the volatile organic analysis of these
n Tank Closure Investigation Tanks 53 and 56, Tank Farm
Five, Naval Education and Training Center, Newport, RI. Prepared
by: TRC Environmental Consultants, Inc. East Hartford,
Connecticut. Project number 6760-N81-90; June 1991; page 26.
Ibid., page 4.
Ibid., page 16.
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samples confirmed the presence of several Volatile Organic
Compounds (VOCs) in the ground water in the Tank 53 ring drain,
and the absence of VOCs in the ground water in the Tank 56 ring
drain. In 1990, the tank samples were characterized and surface
soil samples were collected from above each of the tanks under a
remedial investigation of the entire site by TRC Environmental
Consultants, Inc (TRC). Highlights of TRC's investigation with
respect to Tanks 53 and 56 are presented in this paper below.
TRC FIELD INVESTIGATION ACTIVITIES
The purpose of the TRC 1990 tank closure investigation was three-
fold: 1) to install additional monitor wells and collect soil
and ground water samples to determine the presence and extent of
contamination near Tanks 53 and 56; 2) to replace monitor wells
which were damaged by contractors working on the adjacent new
Fire Fighting Training Center; and 3) to install a large-
diameter well near Tank 53 for possible free-product recovery.
A total of five new wells were installed near the two tanks. Two
additional monitor wells, MW-9 and MW-10, were installed
northwest of Tank 56.~ These wells were installed to provide
information on the ground water quality down gradient of Tank 56.
Based on the information presented in the ERA tank closure plan
(ERA,1988), ground water in this area of the site flows to the
west or northwest. Two monitor wells were also installed near
25 Ibid., page 11.
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Tank 53 to replace wells damaged during the construction of the
adjacent Fire fighting Training Center. In addition, one 8-inch
diameter well suitable for free-product recovery, was installed
adjacent to the north side of Tank 53. Soil and ground water
samples were collected for laboratory analysis to assess the
nature and extent of contamination around each tank.
In addition to the new soil boring and monitor well sample
reSUlts, this assessment considered the analytical results of
tank and surface soil samples previously collected by TRC at the
site. The tank contents were sampled during TRC's 1990 remedial
investigation of the entire tank farm under the Navy's
Installation Restoration Program managed under CERCLA. The tanks
were sampled to characterize the tank contents. Surface soil
samples were also collected under that investigation to assess
the general surface soil quality around the tanks.
TANK CONTENTS Samples were collected of oil and water contained
within Tanks 53 and 56. The samples contained high
concentrations of chlorinated and aromatic hydrocarbons,
base/neutral/acid extractable compounds and several metals. The
oil sample from Tank 56 also contained a detectable concentration
of PCB Aroclor 1016 (estimated 1.6 ppm) .26 Water samples from
both tanks contained detectable concentrations of chlorinated and
aromatic hydrocarbons, semi-volatile organics, and several
Ibid., page 18.
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metals. n The tank water samples were not analyzed for
pesticides/PCBs.
GEOLOGY, HYDROGEOLOGY Tank farm five is located along the east
shore of Narragansett Bay. Land surface slopes generally to the
north and west across the tank farm site, from an elevation of
over 90 feet above mean low water (MLW) to less than 10 feet
above MLW along the eastern portion of Gomes Brook on the
northern edge of the tank farm. The average slope of the land
surface in the tank farm area is 0.04 ft/ft, slightly less to the
north-northeast, and greater to the west. 28
site specific geologic data gathered during the site remedial
investigation indicates that the bedrock surface slopes generally
to the north and west across the site from an elevation of over
70 feet above MLW near Tank 59 to approximately 40 feet above MLW
near Tank 49.~ It should be noted that bedrock was excavated at
most, if not at all, of the underground storage tank locations
during the tank construction/installation. This may have
required excavation 10 to 30 feet into bedrock to a total depth
of approximately 40 feet below grade at the tank locations.~ As
a result, the existing bedrock surface at the tank farm is very
28
29
Ibid.
Ibid., page 15.
Ibid.
Ibid.
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irregular.
Ground water levels in the tank Farm five monitor wells were
measured on July 17, 1990 and October 25, 1990, in conjunction
with ground water sampling activities. 31 The ground water level
measurements and elevations are summarized in Table 432 appendix
A. Figure 633 of appendix A shows the ground water level
elevation contour map developed from water levels measured at
site monitoring wells on July 17, 1990. This map shows that
water level contours over the Tank Farm five area generally mimic
the land surface contours with ground flow directions to the
north and north west directions translating to a direct flow to
the Narragansett Bay. Figure 7~ of appendix A is a more
detailed diagram of ground water level elevation contours in the
area of Tanks 53 and 56. Figure 7 includes ground water level
data from wells installed by ERA in 1985 and 1986. Generally,
water level elevations obtained from the wells in the areas of
Tanks 53 and 56 describe a smooth, east-to-west sloping water
table around these tanks.
CONTAMINATION MIGRATION (see figures 3 and 4 appendix A for
31 Ibid., page 16.
32 Ibid., appendix Di table 4.
n Ibid., appendix Di figure 6.
~ Ibid., appendix Di figure 7.
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locations of monitoring wells in the vicinity of Tanks 53 and 56)
comparison of analytical results from samples collected as part
of this sampling program to available background soil and ground
water quality information indicates areas near the tanks have
been affected by on-site activities. Surface soils above the
tanks have been affected to some degree, based on the results of
a limited soil sampling program. Petroleum hydrocarbons were
detected in surface soil samples, but at low concentrations. It
should be noted that the surface soil samples were collected from
grade to a depth of six inches below grade. Since there may be
two or more feet of soil above the tanks, the soils below 6
inches and immediately above the tank may have higher
concentrations of oil residuals. This is dependant upon how any
oil may have been deposited in the areas (e.g., spills or tank
overflow), and upon what natural processes (e.g., biodegradation)
may have occurred to reduce any contaminant concentrations.
Subsurface soil samples collected from borings (M-9 and M-IO)
down gradient of Tank 56 did not show oil residues. In the
absence of oil residues, the apparently elevated concentrations
of lead and a few other metals in the soil sample from boring M-9
cannot be clearly attributed to discharges from tank 56. At
locations such as well MW-53W, down gradient of tank 53 where
product has been observed on the well, soil contamination beyond
the ring drain should be expected.
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Ground water sample results from wells in the vicinity of Tank 56
show no significant indications of contamination. However, in
the vicinity of Tank 53 free product has repeatedly been observed
in the two ring drain monitor wells (MW-53W and MW-53E) and
dissolved hydrocarbons have been detected in ground water samples
from these wells and other nearby down gradient wells (RW-1 and
MW-7). Other ground water sample results from the Tank 53 area
indicate that dissolved hydrocarbons were observed in the ground
water at least as far down gradient as well MW86-2.
Table 535 of appendix A provides a summary of ground water sample
analytical results which exceeded developed action levels. No
applicable action levels are available for the soil matrix. Soil
cleanup levels are typically decided by the regulators on a case-
by-case basis, taking into consideration factors such as human
health risk, land use, toxicity, and feasibility of cleanup.
HUMAN HEALTH RISK ASSESSMENT A qualitative health risk
assessment was performed by TRC to determine the potential
impacts on human health associated with the use of Tanks 53 and
56 at Tank farm five. The primary objectives of the risk
assessment were to examine exposure to pathways and to estimate
the potential adverse effects associated with the contaminants of
concern at the site under current conditions. The conclusions of
the risk assessment indicated that while a variety of toxic
35 Ibid., appendix Di table 13.
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agents have been found on-site, including arsenic, lead, mercury,
polycyclic aromatic hydrocarbons, and the pesticides DDT, and
DOE, the potential for an adverse effect on human health is low.
This was based on the levels of contaminants detected and the
current uses of the site. The potential problem with this line
of reasoning in risk assessment is that we have observed future
land use following contamination which was not previously
contemplated. For example another Area Of Contamination (AOC) at
NETC mentioned previously is the old Fire Fighting Training area.
Presently a day care center and playground are sited over the old
Fire Fighting Training Aoe. As noted previously the Navy has
routinely bought and sold real property as needs change. The
real property at Tank Farm Five could be sold when no longer
needed and possibly be used for residential purposes. There are
currently residential homes adjacent to the tank farm. The
future use of excessed property needs to be considered in the
risk assessment as well as the present use for reasons stated
above. Another item not fully considered in the risk assessment
report is the accessibility of young children to the contaminated
sites. Tank Farm Five is located next to a major navy housing
area where lOOs of young children live. The area around Tank
Farm Five is wooded and fenced off from intruders. However, the
very nature of the property (wooded with hiking trails and a
brook) is an alluring attraction for young people looking for the
adventure of an afternoon hike in the woods. Several places in
the perimeter fence are not adequately secured to intrusion. In
38
fact, immediately across the street from a large Navy housing
area (with 100s of small children) is a gate in the tank farm
perimeter fence which has a ground clearance gap of about 2 feet
allowing easy access to the grounds. In addition there is
evidence of intrusion left on the trails in the form of food
packaging.
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INTERIM GROUND WATER AND SOIL REMEDIATION PROPOSAL
In the spring of 1990, the Navy contracted with TRC Environmental
Consultants, Inc. to install additional monitoring wells and to
collect soil, water, and tank content samples to determine the
presence and extent of contamination in and around Tanks 53 and
56. The oil product samples contained high concentrations of
chlorinated and aromatic hydrocarbons, base/neutral/acid
extractable compounds (BNAs) and several metals.~ Water samples
from both tanks contained detectable concentrations of
chlorinated and aromatic hydrocarbons, semi-volatile organics,
and several metals. TI Surface soil samples showed low
concentrations of petroleum hydrocarbons and lead. Five soil
boring samples contained detectable concentrations of both BNAs
and petroleum hydrocarbons. Ground water sample results
indicated the presence of floating hydrocarbon product and ground
water contaminated with chlorinated and aromatic hydrocarbons and
polynuclear aromatic hydrocarbons in the vicinity of Tank 53. 38
36 Installation Restoration Program, Naval Education and
Training Center, Newport, RI. Final Proposed Plan Tanks 53 and
56 at Tank Farm Five; May 1992. By: Naval Facilities
Engineering Command, Department of the Navy, Philadelphia, PA.
Page 9.
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Pursuant to RIDEM tank closure requirements, the Navy during the
past year (1992) contracted out and completed the removal of the
sludge, oil and water layers from Tanks 53 and 56. After removal
of the tanks contents to an off-site facility for treatment, the
tank walls were steam-cleaned to ensure that no contamination was
left prior to tank demolition. Confirmatory samples (to verify
steam cleaning operations) of concrete from inside the tanks have
been analyzed for Toxicity Characteristic Leaching Potential
(TCLP) and have been found to be below detection levels.
Several pumping wells were installed around these two tanks prior
to removal of their contents to avoid tank damage and potential
tank flotation due to hydrostatic pressure from adjacent ground
water. A sump pump, activated by an increase in hydrostatic
pressure, was installed to remove ground water from the ring
drains around the tanks during periods of high ground water flow,
e.g. heavy rainfall. An air stripping system with activated
carbon was constructed to treat the tank's contents as well as
the contaminated ground water as it was removed from around the
tanks.
Presently, ground water from the ring drains is being pumped and
transferred to another tank nearby, pending approval of a permit
modification with the City of Newport for discharge into their
waste water treatment plant.
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Remediation of soil contamination around Tanks 53 and 56 is being
addressed as part of the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act
(RCRA) tank closure activities previously discussed. The
complete closure of Tanks 53 and 56 (e.g. demolition and back
filling) has been postponed until additional information is
obtained on the complete nature and extent of soil and ground
water contamination around these two tanks. The Navy has
recently initiated an investigation that will determine the
horizontal and vertical extent of soil contamination. This
information will be utilized to proceed with soil remediation in
accordance with RIDEM's tank closure requirements.
THE NAVY'S PROPOSED INTERIM REMEDIAL ACTION
The Navy's proposal of the below interim remedial action for
contaminated ground water, is the result of an evaluation of
different ground water treatment options. A complete FS report,
which will describe and evaluate final remedial alternatives for
Tank Farm Five is scheduled for development upon conclusion of
the Phase II investigation. Two different ground water treatment
technologies were considered for this management of migration
action: extraction and treatment with an air stripper; and
ultraviolet oxidation (UV/oxidation). The following paragraphs
describe the proposed interim action for ground water
remediation.
The proposed interim remedial action would consist of extraction,
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treatment, and discharge of treated ground water. The extraction
system would be constructed around tanks 53 and 56 and within the
approximate boundaries of the contamination plume to maximize the
collection of contaminated ground water. The Navy currently
plans to install approximately five wells, pumping at various
rates, which would contain the plume and collect contaminated
water from around the tanks. Two of the wells would be placed
near Tank 53 and another near Tank 56 to prevent ground water
from migrating.~ The remaining two wells would be placed near
the tanks, in the overburden and at the weathered bedrock. A
monitoring program would be developed during the design and
submitted for regulatory approval.
The proposed treatment process would include removal of metals
and VOC's from the water as follows: prior to VOC treatment,
dissolved metals in the extracted ground water would be
significantly reduced using a coagulation/filtration process so
that they would not interfere with the VOC treatment process. 40
In this process, a chemical would be added to precipitate the
metals out of solution in a settling tank. The remainder of the
precipitated metal oxides would be separated from the water by
passing the water through filters. The filters would be
backwashed periodically to prevent clogging. The solid material
cleaned from the filter would be handled in accordance with
39
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Federal, state and local regulations. The water extracted from
the solids would then be cycled through the on-site water
treatment system.
Several ground water treatment options were considered to reduce
voe contamination, including air stripping and UV/oxidation
(using either hydrogen peroxide or ozone as an oxidant). Both
technologies are effective in treating voes.
The UV/oxidation process destroys organic compounds in water by
exposing them to a chemical oxidant (for example, hydrogen
peroxide) in the presence of UV light. The combined effects of
UV light and the oxidant promote rapid breakdown of organic
molecules. In the oxidation process, organic contaminants are
broken down into simpler, non-hazardous substances such as carbon
dioxide, water, salts, sUlfates, nitrates, and organic and
inorganic acids. Some by-products have discharge requirements
(e.g., acetone, sulfates, nitrates), that would need to be met if
this treatment technology is chosen. The contaminated ground
water would be mixed with the oxidant and pumped into a reactor
(or series of reactors) where water would be exposed to UV light.
The resulting effluent would be sampled to ensure that the water
meets appropriate discharge standards consistent with the final
discharge option.
A treatability study would be conducted prior to the final design
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of the VOC treatment system to determine the appropriate oxidant
and concentration necessary to destroy the VOCs. In addition,
this study would provide information of the compounds and
concentrations likely to be present in the effluent. In
addition, a ground water model may be developed to support the
design of this interim remedial action.
If the Navy obtains the appropriate permit, discharge of the
treated ground water could be through a sewer connection from an
on-site treatment facility to the pUblic sewer system for
conveyance to the local waste water treatment facility (WWTF) as
was done just this summer (1992) in the case of the waste water
constituent from inside the tanks. This is the preferred method
of discharge. The treated water would meet retreatment
requirements or other applicable standards before entering the
sewer system. Final treatment and disposal would occur at the
WWTF. The Navy is currently discussing this option with the
Newport Waste water Treatment Facility (WWTF) .41 If the WWTF is
unable to accept the pretreated water from the site due to flow
restrictions or restrictions imposed by other requirements or
standards, the treated water could be recycled back into the
aquifer up gradient or discharged to a surface water body on
base. The aquifer may not be able to accept all of the effluent
from the ground water treatment facility if ground water were
recharged up gradient. For either the aquifer recharge or the
41 Ibid., page 16.
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surface water discharge option, the treated water would meet all
applicable requirements or standards. If either up gradient
recharge or discharge to surface water is selected as the
discharge option, the exact location and treatment requirements
would be determined and submitted for regulatory review and
approval before implementation. The final discharge option for
the treated water will be reevaluated at the time of the final
ROD.
Because the purpose of this proposed action is to begin cleanup
of the contaminated ground water around Tanks 53 and 56, and is
not meant to be the'permanent remedy for Tank Farm Five, the Navy
has assumed that the action would last for five years. After
five years (or after the ROD for the final remedy, whichever
comes first), the Navy and the regulatory agencies will review
the monitoring data and evaluate the effectiveness of the interim
action. The remainder of Tank Farm Five and all of Tank Farm
Four is being studied for clean up options under Installation
Restoration (IR) program SUbject to CERCLA. Lessons learned in
the interim action at Tank Farm Five will hopefully be
incorporated down stream at other sites. If the interim action
is performing up to the specifications in the final ROD, the
interim action could become part of the overall site remedy. If
modifications need to be made to the collection or treatment
systems, they could be incorporated into the final ROD for the
site.
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COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF THE PROPOSED INTERIM REMEDIAL ACTION
In FS reports conducted for remediating hazardous waste sites
under CERCLA, the USEPA requires that remedial alternatives be
evaluated using nine criteria. The nine criteria are used to
select a remedy that meets the national superfund program goals
of protecting human health and the environment, maintaining
protection over time, and minimizing untreated waste.
Definitions of the nine criteria and a summary of the Navy's
evaluation of the proposed interim remedial action using the nine
criteria are provided below:
1. OVERALL PROTECTION OF HUMAN HEALTH AND THE ENVIRONMENT
Overall Protection of Human Health and the Environment includes
an assessment of how human and environmental risks are properly
eliminated, reduced, or controlled through treatment, engineering
controls, or institutional controls.
The Navy feels the interim remedial action for addressing ground
water contamination would provide overall protection of human
health and the environment. Protection would be provided by
containment of the plume to prevent the migration of contaminated
ground water to currently uncontaminated areas, and by permanent
reduction of contaminant concentrations in the water through
treatment and off-site disposal of the sludge produced by metals
pretreatment.
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2. APPLICABLE OR RELEVANT AND APPROPRIATE REQUIREMENTS
Compliance with Applicable or Relevant and Appropriate
Requirements (ARARs) addresses whether or not a remedy complies
with all State and Federal environmental and public health laws
and requirements that apply or are relevant and appropriate to
the conditions and cleanup options at a specific site. If an
ARAR cannot be met, the analysis of the alternative must provide
the grounds for invoking a statutory waiver. When comparing
interim remedies, it is appropriate to analyze compliance with
only those laws and regulation that are applicable or relevant
and appropriate to the limited scope of the interim action.
However, the interim action would be consistent with the final
site remedy.
The use of an air stripper as the ground water treatment
technology would meet the state of Rhode Island ambient air
guidelines if air controls are provided. However, since this
technology only removes hazardous chemicals from the ground water
rather then destroying them, it was not selected as the preferred
ground water treatment technology. The Navy selected
UV/oxidation with RIDEM's endorsement because it would meet all
applicable or relevant and appropriate requirements by destroying
the volatile organic contaminations without generating large
quantities of regulated waste. 42 However, the USEPA is turning
negative on the oxidation process because it does leave some
42 Ibid., page 18.
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solid waste which requires disposal. The EPA is pushing for
further studies which will in turn postpone the ultimate clean up
another year or more. RIDEM's position is that any method will
have some solid waste problems. The oxidation process has
previously proven itself when the waste water inside the tanks
were emptied. The process is affordable and easily applicable to
business. RIDEM does not want to waste another year or more
while USEPA decides to reinvent the wheel through numerous and
costly and time consuming studies.
3. LONG-TERM EFFECTIVENESS AND PERMANENCE
Long-term Effectiveness and Permanence refers to the ability of
an alternative to maintain reliable protection of human health
and the environment over time once the cleanup goals are met.
The proposed interim remedial action is expected to meet the
cleanup objectives by preventing migration of the plume and by
removing and treating the water. Potential residual risk would
remain because the entire plume of contamination would not be
remediated by the interim remedial action.
4. REDUCE TOXICITY, MOBILITY OR VOLUME THROUGH TREATMENT
Reduction of toxicity, Mobility, or Volume through Treatment are
three principal measures of the overall performance of an
alternative. The 1986 amendments to the Superfund statute
emphasize that, whenever possible, a remedy should be selected
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that uses treatment to permanently reduce the level of toxicity
of contaminants at the site, the spread of contaminants, or the
volume or amount of contamination at the site.
Preventing the spread of contaminants by pumping to contain the
plume will reduce the volume of contaminated ground water.
contaminated ground water from around Tanks 53 and 56 would be
contained by controlling migration with extraction wells. The
Navy feels that treating the extracted water using the
UV/oxidation technology would permanently and significantly
reduce the toxicity and mobility of contaminants.
5. SHORT-TERM EFFECTIVENESS
Short-term Effectiveness refers to the likelihood of adverse
impacts on human health or the environment that may be posed
during the construction and implementation of an alternative
until cleanup goals are achieved.
The community and environment are not expected to be adversely
affected during implementation of the proposed action. workers
installing the ground water extraction system and treatment plant
operators would wear protective clothing, and follow appropriate
safety procedures to minimize the chance of exposure to
contaminants, and meet Occupational Safety and Health Act (OSHA)
training requirements. Monitoring would also be conducted to
ensure protectiveness.
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6. IMPLEMENTABILITY
Implementability refers to the technical and administrative
feasibility of an alternative, including the availability of
materials and services needed to implement the alternative. The
extraction and treatment technologies proposed for the interim
action are implementable and have been successfully demonstrated
at other sites.
7. COST
Cost includes the capital (up-front) cost of implementing an
alternative as well as the cost of operating and maintaining the
alternative over a 5-year period, and net present worth of both
capital and operation and maintenance costs. The capital,
operation and maintenance, and total cost of the interim action
is presented in the description of the Navy's proposed interim
remedial action.
8. STATE ACCEPTANCE
State Acceptance addresses whether, based on its review of the
RIfFS and Proposed Plan, the State concurs with, opposes, or has
no comment on the alternative the Navy is proposing as the remedy
for the site. The State has reviewed, endorsed and commented on
this Proposed Plan and the Navy has taken the State's comments
into account.
9. COMMUNITY ACCEPTANCE
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Community Acceptance addresses whether the pUblic concurs with
the Navy's Proposed Plan. Community acceptance of this Proposed
Plan will be evaluated based on comments received at the upcoming
pUblic meetings and during the public comment period.
THE NAVY'S RATIONALE FOR PROPOSING THE INTERIM REMEDIAL ACTION
Based on current information and analysis of the tank closure
investigation and phase I RI Reports, the Navy believes that the
proposed interim remedial action for Tank Farm Five is consistent
with the requirements of the Superfund law and its amendments,
specifically section 121 of CERCLA and to the extent practicable,
the National oil and Hazardous Substances Contingency Plan (NCP).
This interim remedial action focuses on containment of ground
water contamination that has emanated from Tanks 53 and 56. The
interim remedial action proposed by the Navy is an effort to
begin remedial action to prevent further degradation of the
ground water and potentially, the estuarine ecosystem, by
capturing the ground water at the leading edge of the contaminant
plume to prevent migration of contaminants. The cleanup goal is
to extract ground water contaminated with chemicals at
concentrations exceeding drinking water standards. The proposed
action is consistent with any future source control or ground
water remedial actions. It is readily implementable and would
provide short and long term protection of human health and the
environment, would attain all Federal and State applicable or
52
relevant and appropriate public health and environmental
requirements, would reduce the mobility and toxicity of
contaminated ground water, and would utilize permanent solutions
to the maximum extent practicable.
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CHAPTERS
NEGOTIATIONS , ADMINISTRATIVE ACTIONS
In 1985 the Commander, Naval Education and Training Center
(NETC), became concerned that NETC would soon be in non-
compliance with the proposed regulations for underground storage
facilities for petroleum and hazardous materials regarding the
abandoned tanks in Tank Farms 4 and 5 at NETC.~ At that time
the preliminary estimate for testing and closure of the abandoned
tanks was 6 million dollars. The Commander, NETC requested
assistance from the Northern Division, Naval Facilities
Engineering Command (NORTHNAVFACENGCOM) regarding a waiver of
non-compliance. The Commander, NETC also informed RIDEM in April
of 1985 that the 180 day time constraint in the proposed
legislation for the closure of the tanks was unrealistically
short and should be extended to no less than three years.
In 1986 NETC received a permit from RIDEM for the storage of
hazardous waste beyond ninety days. No hazardous waste treatment
or disposal occurred at the facility. The permit identified a
waste container storage site located adjacent to Building 1166 in
the Coddington Cove area of the NETC complex in Newport, RI.
Various hazardous wastes are stored in fifty-five gallon drums.
The permit was issued on the condition that NETC would close
~ Naval Education and Training Center (NETC), Newport, RI
Letter ser. #5090 dtd. 5 Apr. 1985.
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storage tanks 53 and 56 by 1988. As noted earlier, these tanks
contained three layers: sludge, water, and oil.~ (USEPA region
I memo to Chief NH/RI Waste Regulation section)
In July of 1988, the Director of Public Works, NETC forwarded a
draft closure plan to RIDEM for Tanks 53 and 56 at Tank Farm 5. 45
The closure plan was prepared by Environmental Resource
Associates, INC. RIDEM reviewed the plan and provided comments
in November of 1988.~ (Ltr dtd 10 November 1988 Fm RIDEM
Division of Air and Hazardous Materials) RIDEM questioned the
proper disposal method for the water portion of the tank contents
and commented that each hazardous constituent in the effluent
must correspond to EPA mandated discharge levels. RIDEM also
concluded that the only acceptable tank closure plan alternative
was "3B" of the plan which required the complete decontamination
and removal of the tanks. Correspondence between RIDEM Division
of Air and Hazardous Materials, Environmental Resource
Associates, Inc., and the Navy continued through early 1989. In
February 1989 RIDEM again responded to NETC's contractor ERA
concerning the amended closure plan.~ Some pertinent comments
~ Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) Region 1 memo to
Chief NH/RI Waste Regulation section dtd.
45 NETC Ltr. ser. #388/424E dtd. 12 July 1988.
~ Rhode Island Department of Environmental Management
(RIDEM) Division of Air and Hazardous Materials (HazMat) Letter
dtd. 10 November 1988.
47 RIDEM Division of HazMat Ltr. dtd. 1 Feb 1989.
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included the following:
1 RIDEM agreed to the disposal of the water layer of the
tanks contents via the Newport Waste Water Treatment
plant assuming required permits were obtained from the
Newport Waste Water Treatment Plant prior to discharge.
2. RIDEM agreed to leave in place the walls of the
concrete tank along with rubble from the demolition of
the tank roof and floor provided the material was
cleaned of contamination and proved to be non-
hazardous.
3. RIDEM agreed to the proposed method of purging the
surrounding groundwater of contamination provided
future investigation of the groundwater would be
conducted in order to confirm the success of the
operation.
In May of 1989, the Director for Public Works, NETC informed
RIDEM Division of Air and Hazardous Materials that the closure of
Tanks 53 and 56 would be included with the remedial actions of
the other Areas of contamination at NETC on the Supper Fund List.
It would be incorporated into the newly instituted Installation
Restoration (IR) program which identifies contamination as a
result of past disposal practices and selects appropriate
corrective measures. However, the Remedial
Investigation/Feasibility Study (RI/FS) program scheduled for
NETC was at a minimum, a two year study program in which llQ
remedial action would be taken. According to NETC, this change
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in plans had the blessing of RIDEM through its Technical Review
Committee (TRC) member assigned to the RIfFS NETC project under
CERCLA. 48
RIDEM Division of Air and HazMat responded in July 1989 via
certified mail refusing to allow NETC to delay the closure of
Tanks 53 and 56 by including them in the RIfFS of Tank Farm 5.
RIDEM explained that NETC's hazardous waste permit specifically
stated that site C, which included Tanks 53 and 56, was scheduled
for closure during calendar year 1988 in accordance with the TSD
regulations. The Permit also stated that noncompliance of the
Permit conditions constituted a violation of the Rhode Island
Hazardous Waste Management Act of 1978, and is grounds for permit
revocation. In other words if NETC wanted to maintain the permit
for their hazardous waste holding site adjacent to building 1196,
they would have to continue with the closure plan previously
agreed to. RIDEM directed NETC to begin closure of Tanks 53 and
56 immediately. RIDEM addressed the ground water contamination
problem as well. NETC was offered the option of requesting a
postponement of the groundwater remediation if it could be proved
that groundwater contamination was being effected by leakage from
tanks other than tanks 53 and 56 within Tank Farm 5. The
reasoning being that the groundwater contamination could best be
dealt with when all sources of the pollution at Tank Farm 5 were
48 NETC ltr. sere #602f424E dtd. 16 May 1989.
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identified and corrected pursuant to CERCLA. 49
The Director for Public Works NETC rebutted RIDEM's contention
that failure to close Tanks 53 and 56 in 1988 was a violation of
the conditions of their permit. The Director also informed RIDEM
that at the time of the Permit application the closure cost was
estimated at about $65K each and by 1989 had grown to $1,OOOK, a
1,500% increase.~ The earliest that the funding would be
available would be 1992. So in effect, NETC was saying - the
closure of the tanks is already in the RIfFS program (as a
component of AOC #13) managed by USEPA scheduled for closure in
92 in accordance with the Installation Restoration Program. And
we (NETC) see no reason to expend the money and effort needed to
excellarate EPA's schedule. NETC's reasoning continued along the
lines that funds for the actual closure of Tanks 53 and 56 were
lacking anyway, so why pursue something that in all probability
will not happen any time soon. As will be explained later,
although RIDEM pressed the issue, the actual closure of Tanks 53
and 56 had not commenced as of the writing of this paper
(December 1992) due to bUdgetary and other reasons.
RIDEM and felt as though they had already bent over backwards
when the Permit was issued by allowing NETC over 2 years in which
49
1989.
RIDEM Division of Air and HazMat Cert. ltr. dtd. 7 July
NETC ltr. sere #671f424E dtd. 27 July 1989.
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to close the Tanks when the Regulations called for just 1~0 days.
In light of the growing public awareness of environmental issues
and the cold shoulder they were getting from NETC, they felt it
was time to flex a little regulatory muscle. On 28 July 1989
after NETC's latest refusal to comply, members from RIDEM and EPA
Region 1 descended upon NETC Newport and conducted an inspection
of NETC's Hazardous Waste Management Program. Of no surprise,
NETC was found in violation Rhode Island Rules and Regulations
for Hazardous Waste as amended 20 October 1988. Specifically
NETC was found in violation of the following rules:
1. RI Rule 9.06; 40 CFR 264.16(c). Failure to ensure that
all facility personnel complete an annual training program.
At the time of the inspection it was determined that
numerous personnel had not received the required annual
training review.
2. RI Rule 2.02; 40 CFR 270.30(a). Duty to comply with
permit conditions. section VI of the hazardous waste
storage permit issued to NETC 10 September 1986 clearly
states that a permanent closure plan for Tanks No. 53 and 56
in Tank Farm 5 was to be submitted, and closure scheduled
for calendar year 1988. OEM and EPA inspection report
references NETC's correspondence leading to the inspection
which indicated that closure of the tanks was not scheduled
for completion as required. It was clear from the report
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that the purpose of the inspection was to apply the
regulatory hammer having failed to persuade NETC to comply
with the permit conditions.
As part of the inspection report NETC was given a compliance
schedule. Several mile-stones were included. The bottom line
was that by approximately 1 December 1990 NETC was to have
cleaned the tanks, implemented groundwater decontamination
measures, and reballasted the tanks with sand.
It was made clear to NETC that maintenance of their current
Hazardous Waste Permit was conditional upon closure of the Tanks
in accordance with the Letter of Deficiency schedule. Failure to
comply with requirements of the report would automatically result
in the issuance of a Notice of Violation and Order and Penalty,
and would be grounds for permit revocation. Enforcement actions
resulting from continued noncompliance could result in a maximum
fine of $10,000 per day and/or five (5) years imprisonment. 51
Under section VII (D) of the final Authorization Memorandum of
Agreement between Rhode Island OEM and the USEPA, the State has
the primary obligation to take action against persons in
violation of RCRA. In September 1989 the Director, Waste
Management Division, EPA Region 1 informed the Chief, Division of
51 RIDEM Division of Air and HazMat Letter of Deficiency
(LOD) under the Hazardous Waste Management Act; Cert. ltr. dtd.
29 August 1989.
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Air and HazMat, RIDEM via official correspondence that EPA would
accept the NETC case for Federal enforcement action should RIDEM
find that they do not have the resources to pursue the matter.
Copies of the letter were provided to NETC and Northern Division,
Naval facilities Engineering Command (NORTHNAVFACENGCOM) to
ensure NETC got the point that the Compliance Order was a serious
matter and cooperation was in everyone's best interest. NETC was
left with the realization of two main points. first, that the
regulatory agencies were in agreement amongst themselves, and
therefore, the chances of persuading one agency to make
contradictory rUlings (to buy some time regarding the tank
closures) with the other agency was remote. Second, the matter
had the highest level of visibility within RIDEM and EPA Region 1
Hazardous Waste Divisions. Therefore, NETC would need additional
horsepower from the Navy chain of command and/or hopefully
another Federal Agency to postpone the inevitable day of
compliance. 52
Following the Compliance Order, the Commander, NETC sent a
message to his immediate superior (Chief of Naval Education and
Training (CNET) in Pensacola FL) regarding the unfavorable
inspection. 53 NETC informed CNET that the directed compliance
schedule could not be met due to lack of funds ($2 Million) and
52 RIDEM Chief of Division of Air and HazMat cert. ltr.
dtd. 12 September 1989.
53 NETC radio message date/time 211125Z SEP 89.
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the unrealistic time line. NETC closed by asking legal,
technical, and funding support from North Division Naval
Facilities Engineering Command (NORTHNAVFACENGCOM PHILADELPHIA
PA).
NETC responded to RIDEM in October 89 regarding the August Letter
of Deficiency resulting from NETC's unfavorable July 89
inspection. In its response, NETC anticipated the required $2
Million funding late in calendar year 1990 and made a counter
proposal to RIDEM in which the contract for cleaning and
demolition would be awarded before 31 December 1990 with complete
closure accomplished by the second quarter of calendar year 1992.
In addition a request was made to defer groundwater remediation
measures until the Remedial Investigation/Feasibility study RI/FS
phase of the IR under CERCLA is completed in late 1993. This
response was totally unacceptable to DEM.~
RIDEM was riled by NETC's continued maneuvering and apparent
stonewalling. In November 1989 following NETC's request for
continued delays, the Chief of the Division of Air and HazMat,
RIDEM wrote in frustration to the office of the Chief of Naval
operations, OP-45 with copies to congressional delegates, EPA and
others (OP-45 is the ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION, SAFETY AND
OCCUPATIONAL HEALTH DIVISION within the office of the Chief of
~ NETC, Director for Public Works ltr. ser. #739/424E
dtd. 3 Oct. 1989.
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Naval Operations). RIDEM as with any regulatory agency preferred
voluntary and expeditious compliance with its rulings and
directives in order to avoid the necessity of negative
enforcement tactics, which in this case could include: Notice of
Violation (NOV), revocation of NETC's Hazardous Waste Permit,
monetary fines, and imprisonment. I believe RIDEM did not feel
completely confident in the outcome of a full scale battle with
NETC and was therefore searching for alternatives short of
negative enforcement actions. RIDEM may have felt they had
partially bought into NETC's delaying tactics in the early days
when they were learning how to apply the new Hazardous Waste
Regulations. In other words, NETC's progress was slow in the
early days but seemed to be reasonable given the large
bureaucracy that it is. There may also have been a political
reality check as well. The Navy pulled out of Newport in a big
way in the early 1970s. Good relations between the defense
industry and the state spells jobs and votes. Whatever the
reason, RIDEM had cut short on its original threat in its Letter
of Deficiency (LOD). Earlier, in the LOD, RIDEM had informed
NETC that failure to comply with the directed schedule (tank
closure within 90 days of 1 Nov. 1990) would automatically result
in the issuance of a Notice of Violation (NOV) and permit
revocation, and would constitute grounds for enforcement actions
resulting in a maximum fine of $10,000 per day and/or five (5)
years imprisonment. Now, RIDEM was backing off. In the
compliant to the CNO's office, the Division Chief's strongest
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threat was meek at best, namely to not renew NETC's Hazardous
Waste permit when it expires in 1991. By doing so RIDEM made it
clear they wanted to continue to pursue all avenues of diplomacy
and hopefully avoid long and drawn out proceedings resulting from
continued noncompliance. conspicuously missing in the Division
Chief's letter to the CNO's office was any mention of the
automatic issuance of the Notice of Violation to NETC. 55 RIDEM's
goal in contacting the CNO's office was that they would somehow
intervene in the procurement of the allocation of funds to
facilitate NETC in awarding the contract in 1990 so that closure
of the tanks could be completed or well underway prior to the
expiration of NETC's Permit on 10 September 1991 and thus avoid a
confrontation.~
Following the Division Chief's complaints to the CNO's office the
Navy moved the matter to the front burner. NORTHNAVFACENGCOM and
NETC began discussions via official correspondence on the details
of awarding the service contract with copies to NETC's boss (CNET
Pensacola, FL) and the office of the CNO (OP-45) .57 Wheels also
began to turn regarding NETC's plan to discharge the contaminated
water portion of the Tanks into Newport's Waste Water Treatment
55 RIDEM Chief, Division of Air and HazMat cert. ltr. dtd.
10 November 1989.
56 RIDEM Division of Air and HazMat ltr. dtd. 29 November
1989.
57 Northern Naval Facility Engineering Command
(NORTHNAVFACENGCOM) Philadelphia, PA ltr. sere #0766/1412/BJH
dtd. 6 December 1989.
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Plant. The Senior Sanitary Engineer, Division of Water
Resources, RIDEM informed the Director, Public Works of NETC
exactly what the particulars were (including RI Regulations for
Water Pollution Control) in order for NETC to proceed with its
discharge plan for the Tank water. 58 By June of 1990 NETC
received correspondence from the City of Newport utilities
Director that NETC's request to discharge treated waste water
from the tanks through the sewer system would be approved
provided they met water quality standards. 59 The planned waste
water treatment at the site would consist of an oil-water
separator, followed by a two-stage counter-current air s~ripper
and two activated carbon absorbers in series.~
In late December RIDEM received a positive response from OP-45
regarding RIDEM's request for assistance. RIDEM was informed
that NORTHNAVFACENGCOM had provided NETC with funds to complete
the design documents required in order to award a closure
contract. Also, funds for the actual closure of the tanks had
been identified in the Fiscal Year 1990 bUdget and would be
available upon completion of the design effort. 61
58 RIDEM Division of Water Resources Itr. dtd. 5 December
1989.
59 city of Newport WPC Department ltr. dtd. 20 June 1990.
NETC, Newport ltr. sere #154/424E dtd. 5 JUly 1990.
61 Chief of Naval operations (CNO) OP-45 ltr. sere
#451C/9U587534 dtd. 26 December 1989.
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However, it soon became increasingly apparent to NETC and
NORTHNAVFACENGCEN that two issues needed to be resolved in order
for the closure plan to proceed in a timely manner. First was
the water discharge question. It was originally hoped that the
2.5 million gallons of the contaminated water constituent of each
tank could be purified by Air stripping and discharged to the
Newport Waste Water Treatment Plant over a three month period.
It now looked like that plan was in jeopardy because of the
difficulty in meeting water quality standards prior to discharge.
The sUbsequent removal and disposal of the sludge, tank cleaning,
closure, and demolition would be held up until the water
constituent was removed. The second and more pressing issue was
the red tape and cumbersome process involved in awarding the
service contract to the civilian contractor (which would do the
actual work in cleaning, closing and backfilling the Tanks and
remediating the surrounding ground water). In the Navy
bureaucracy it is not uncommon for the awarding of contracts to
stretch out for two or more years as each revision passes up and
down the chain of command. It was clear to NETC and
NORTHNAVFACENGCOM that if they followed the standard routine in
awarding the present contract, there was a good chance that by
the time the contract was awarded, the alloted funds for FY 90
would be lost. The battle for funding would have be refought for
the next fiscal year, thereby delaying the whole process another
year. The real potential "show stopper" was the Navy's own
internal defacto deadline of 1 October 1990. The Navy, as part
66
of the Federal government manages its fiscal budget in a 12 month
cycle from 1 October through 30 September. Unexpended funds from
the previous fiscal year are lost from the Navy bUdget. This
meant that if the contract was not awarded in fiscal year 1990 (1
October 1989 through 30 September 1990) then the allotted $2
million for the project would be lost on 1 October 1990. A
meeting was scheduled for 25 January 1990 with RIDEM, EPA, and
the Navy to discuss the above potential roadblocks to the tank
closures.~ It was agreed at the meeting that the award of the
tank closure contract would be targeted for September 1990 to
ensure available funding and permanent tank closure operations
would begin before 31 December 1990.~ Any items resolved were
somewhat academic however, because 4 days later NETC would have
to deal with an oil/hazardous waste spill from tank 53 at tank
farm 5.
62 NORTHNAVFACENGCOM Philadelphia PA Radio message
date/time 111451Z JAN 90.
NETC, Newport ltr. ser. #026/424E dtd. 7 February 1990.
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CHAUER6
NETC 1990 OIL SPILL INCIDENT AND PREVENTION PLAN
On 29 January 1990 there was an oil/hazardous waste spill from
Tank 53, Tank Farm 5 at NETC which resulted in RIDEM's issuance
of an Immediate Compliance Order. While the Navy, RIDEM, and EPA
were meeting four days earlier on 25 January 1990 to iron out
their differences and come to a consensus on a suitable tank
closure schedule, an accident was in the making. As a result of
the oil spill at tank 53 just 4 days after their meeting, the
Navy appeared to the regulators as lackadaisical in their routine
maintenance and monitoring of the tank farms as well as callous
and not completely truthful their true effort and determination
in closing the tanks. RIDEM felt it had accommodated NETC by
compromising on the remediation schedule for awarding the closure
contract. M In a sense, RIDEM went out on a limb for NETC and
got burned for it. Now once again RIDEM found itself having to
retrench back to a hard line position, in this case to get NETC
to rectify the oil spill problem at Tank 53. RIDEM's frustration
with NETC is understandable. NETC had observed a hazardous
situation for months which lead up to the spill but because of
the lack of training and appreciation of the consequences of
groundwater and/or surface water infiltration into the tanks, no
M RIDEM grudgingly accepted NETC's plan to award the
closure contract in late September 1990 at the end of the Navy's
fiscal year; phone interview with Cynthia Gianfrancisco of RIDEM
Division of Air and HazMat, 6 October 1992.
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preventative action was taken to avoid the spill.
By NETC's own admission the gauging chamber (which is at the roof
of the tank) of Tank 53 was routinely covered with water which
eventually would leak down into the Tank through joints in the
roof. Presumably the water came from surface runoff and/or
ground-water. On 22 January during a weekly site visit, NETC's
contractor conducted a routine inspection of the gauging chamber
and found 3 to 4 inches of water on the roof and because it was a
common occurrence no action was taken. The next week on 29
January the contractor observed approximately 8 inches of oil in
the gauging chamber as well as oil seeping out of the earth near
the northwest quadrant of the tank perimeter. The contractor
personnel did not report their observations to NETC until the
next day (30 January). On 30 January NETC personnel inspected
the gauging chamber and found the oil level had increased to 16
inches deep in the bunker. In addition to the gauging chamber,
oil was found in monitoring wells MW-53E and MW-53W. The
mechanics of the problem were that the layer of oil in the Tank
was riding on an ever increasing volume of water coming from
either surface runoff or groundwater thus forcing the oil to
overflow the tank. It was also discovered that the construction
of the adjacent Fire Fighting Trainer may have contributed to the
oil spill. During the construction, soil had been removed from
one edge of the top of the tank, and two large piles of soil had
been placed on the edge of another side of the tank. NETC
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of their RIDEM Hazardous Waste Treatment Facility permit. M
NETC requested $57,200 from NORTHNAVFACENGCOM in order to proceed
with advertisement of contract No. N62472-90-B-1735 to comply
with RIDEM's ICO. NETC also informed its boss, CNET of the
situation.~
On 6 March 1990 NETC informed RIDEM that it had prepared a
contract for removal of the oil phase of Tank 53 and anticipated
that work under the contract would be completed by 5 April 1990.
(Ltr Ser 041/424E dtd 06 MAR 1990 Fm NETC) As a result of the
bad pUblicity from the oil spill at Tank 53, the Navy stepped up
its efforts to permanently close Tanks 53 and 56.
NETC cleaned up the immediate problem of the oil spill and by the
summer of 1990 had resolved how and where to dispose of all of
the contaminated water constituent of the Tanks. Through
extensive negotiations between OEM Division of Water Resources,
Newport Waste Water Treatment facility (WWTF), and NETC a plan
was agreed upon to discharge the water portion of the Tanks to
Newport WWTF after Air Stripping and carbon filtering.
1991 was devoted for the most part to treatment and discharge of
RIDEM ltr. dtd. 15 February 1990.
~ NETC, Newport Navy messages: date/time 271326Z FEB 90
and date/time 271225Z FEB 90.
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approximately 4 million gallons of water from Tanks 53 and 56.
In September of 1991 it was discovered that three other abandoned
tanks (50, 57, and 58) in tank farm 5 were in danger of
overflowing in the same manner in which Tank 53 had overflowed.
The tanks had somehow accumulated 800,000 gallons groundwater
and/or surface water and as in the earlier spill accident at Tank
53 had a layer of old oil floating on top of the water phase. 68
The Navy already had its contractor (OHM) on the scene during the
summer of 1991 treating and discharging the contents of Tanks 53
and 56. Therefor, it was a simple matter of adding these tanks
to the current contract to have them emptied of the water
constituent.
This begs the question, what is the status of the other
Underground Storage Tanks (UST) on the base and navy wide? Is
the intrusion of water into these tanks a chronic problem in the
tank design? A natural question might be, why was it that only
Tanks 53 and 56 were addressed in the closure contract? All of
these questions are interrelated. To start with, Tanks 53 and 56
are unique from other USTs on the base only because they have in
the past contained used oil or waste oil vice product oil. Only
Tanks 53 and 56 are sUbject to Federal and State hazardous waste
storage regulations. However, all tanks at Tank Farms 4 and 5
(including Tanks 53 and 56) are subject to the CERCLA Superfund
68
1991.
NETC, Newport ltr. sere #958/40E dtd. 30 September
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program. It is because of this that RIDEM could force NETC to
close Tanks 53 and 56 as a condition of NETC's base hazardous
waste permit but had no control over the closure of the other
tanks because they were used only for product oil and not waste
oil. As was stated previously, NETC was placed on the National
Priorities List (NPL) in 1989 at which time 13 Areas Of
contamination (AOC) were identified and sUbject to CERCLA for
remediation. Tank Farms 4 and 5 were identified as AOCs.
However, remediation of the Tank Farms under CERCLA are dealt
with as part of the comprehensive base wide cleanup program and
as a result takes considerably longer. Under CERCLA in 1991 the
base was still in the investigation study phase and therefore,
ballast waste water treatment at none of the other tanks had yet
even been contemplated.
OIL SPILL PREVENTION, CONTROL , COUNTERMEASURE PLANS
USEPA has pUblished, at 40 CFR 112, regulations intended to
prevent the discharge of oil from non-transportation-related
onshore and offshore facilities. Those regulations establish
procedures, methods, equipment, and other requirements for
equipment to prevent the discharge of oil into or upon the
navigable waters of the u.s. or adjoining shorelines. The
regulations require the preparation of spill Prevention Control
and Countermeasure (SPCC) Plans to minimize the potential for oil
discharges.
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REQUIREMENTS FOR AN SPCC PLAN Each shore activity which has
facilities SUbject to which the governing regulations apply is
required to prepare and maintain a current SPCC Plan. A separate
SPCC Plan is not prepared for a particular facility, but one SPCC
Plan applies to the entire shore activity and covers control and
countermeasure plans for all facilities of the shore activity
which meet the governing criteria.
An SPCC Plan is required for each shore activity with oil storage
capacity located either along navigable waters, or along
tributaries that empty into navigable waters. New SPCC Plans are
prepared covering new facilities, or existing SPCC Plans are
amended, as new facilities become operational.
GUIDELINES FOR THE PREPARATION & IMPLEMENTATION OF AN SPCC PLAN
The SPCC Plan must be carefully thought out, prepared in
accordance with good engineering practices, and must have the
full approval of management at a level with authority to commit
the necessary resources. If the Plan calls for additional
facilities, procedures, methods, or equipment not yet fully
operational, these items should be discussed in separate
paragraphs. The details of installation and operational start-up
should be explained separately. The complete SPCC Plan should
follow the sequence outlined in the following paragraphs, and
include a discussion of the facility's conformance with the
appropriate guidelines listed.
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**
*
A facility which has experienced one or more spill
events within twelve months should include a written
description of each such spill, corrective action
taken, and plans for preventing recurrence.
Where experience indicates a reasonable potential for
equipment failure such as tank overflow, rupture, or
leakage, the Plan should include a prediction of the
direction, rate of flow, and total quantity of oil
which could be discharged from the facility as a result
of each major type of failure.
Appropriate containment and/or diversionary structures
or equipment to prevent discharged oil from reaching a
navigable water course should be provided. At least
one of the following preventive systems, or its
equivalent, should be used. For onshore facilities,
these elements are recommended:
dikes, berms or retaining walls sUfficiently
impervious to contain spilled oil;
curbing;
culverting, gutters or other drainage
systems;
weirs, booms or other barriers;
spill diversion ponds;
retention ponds; or
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sorbent materials.
When it is determined that the installation of structures or
equipment to prevent discharged oil from reaching the navigable
waters is not practicable, the SPCC Plan should clearly
demonstrate such impracticability. The Plan must provide a
strong oil spill contingency plan and a written commitment of
manpower, equipment and materials required to expeditiously
control and remove any harmful quantity of oil discharged.
In addition to the spill prevention elements listed above, the
Plan should include other effective spill prevention and
containment procedures in conformance with the following
guidelines:
FACILITY DRAINAGE Drainage from diked storage areas should be
restrained by valves or other positive means to prevent a spill
or other excessive leakage of oil into the drainage system or in-
plant effluent treatment system, except where plan systems are
designed to handle that leakage. Diked areas may be emptied by
pumps or ejectors; however, these should be manually activated
and the condition of the accumulation should be examined before
starting to be sure no oil will be discharged into the water.
Flapper-type drain valves used for the drainage of diked areas
should, as far as practical, be of manual, open-and-closed
design. When plant topography drains directly into water courses
and not into wastewater treatment plants, retained storm water
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should be inspected as required by the regulations.
BULK STORAGE TANKS No tank should be used for the storage of oil
unless its material and construction are compatible with the
material stored and conditions of storage, such as pressure and
temperature. All bulk storage tank installations should be
constructed so that a secondary means of containment is provided
for the entire contents of the largest single tank, plus
sufficient freeboard to allow for precipitation. Diked areas
should be sUfficiently impervious to contain spilled oil.
Diked, containment curbs, and pits are commonly employed for this
purpose, but they may not always be appropriate. An alternative
system could consist of a complete drainage trench enclosure
arranged so that a spill could terminate and be safely confined
in an in-plant catchment basin or holding pond. Drainage of
rainwater from the diked area into a storm drain or an effluent
discharge bypassing the in-plant treatment system may be
acceptable if:
the bypass valve is normally sealed closed;
inspection of the run-off rainwater ensures compliance
with applicable water quality standards and will not
cause a harmful discharge;
the bypass valve is opened, and resealed following
drain age under responsible supervision; and
adequate records are kept of such events.
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Buried metallic storage tanks represent a potential for
undetected spills. A new, buried installation should be
protected from corrosion by coatings, cathodic protection, or
other effective methods compatible with local soil conditions.
Buried tanks should at least be sUbjected to regular pressure
testing.
New and old tank installations should, as far as practical, be
fail-safe engineered or updated into a fail-safe engineered
installation to avoid spills. Consideration should be given to
providing one or more of the following devices:
* High liquid level alarms with an audible or visual
signal at a constantly manned operation or surveillance
station; in smaller plants an audible air vent may
suffice.
* High liquid level pump cutoff devices set to stop flow
at a predetermined tank content level, in relation to
size and complexity of the facility.
* Direct audible or code signal communication between the
tank gauger and the pumping station.
* A fast response system for determining the liquid level
of each bulk storage tank such as digital computers,
telepulse, or direct vision gauges or their equivalent.
* Liquid level sensing devices should be regularly tested
to insure proper operation.
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PERSONNEL, TRAINING AND SPILL PREVENTION PROCEDURES Commanding
officers are responsible for properly instructing their personnel
in the operation and maintenance of equipment to prevent the
discharges of oil and applicable pollution control laws, rules
and regulations. Each applicable facility should have a
designated person who is accountable for oil spill prevention and
who reports to line management. Spill prevention briefings for
operating personnel should be conducted at intervals frequent
enough to assure adequate understanding of the SPCC Plan for the
activity. Those briefings should highlight and describe known
spill events or failures, malfunctioning components, and recently
developed precautionary measures.
79
CHAPTER 7
GROUND WATER CLEANUP ACTIVITIES
Surprisingly, USEPA Region 1 stepped in to rule against RIDEM
concerning groundwater remediation. The EPA felt that
groundwater remediation under RCRA would interfere with EPA's
CERCLA Phase I investigation which included all of Tank Farm 5.
As stated earlier, in November of 1989 NETC was placed on the
National Priorities List (NPL). At that time NETC requested that
the closure of Tanks 53 and 56 be delayed and incorporated into
the remedial investigation/feasibility study (RI/FS) to be
conducted pursuant to CERCLA. RIDEM refused, stating that this
was not a viable alternative due to the fact that closure was a
required element of the RCRA permit issued prior to the National
Priorities Listing (NPL). Now however, EPA wanted to ensure that
enough testing was done to adequately assess the nature and
extent of contamination at Tank Farm #5. RIDEM was then blocked
by EPA from initiating enforcement actions pursuant to RCRA
concerning groundwater remediation unless the CERCLA phase I
sampling data (phase I sampling of the ground water was scheduled
for the Fall of 1990) failed to evince the presence of
contamination from other tanks in Tank Farm #5. Since the
overruling by EPA dealt only with groundwater remediation RIDEM
continued to monitor NETC's overall progress in closing Tanks 53
and 56.
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By June of 1990 a final proposed Tank closure contract (minus
groundwater/soil remediation) was provided to RIDEM for review.
The Tank closure plan was divided into three phases:~
(1) Removal of the Tank Contents.
(2) Initial Assessment study.
(3) Remedial Design/Remedial Action and Long-Term
Monitoring.
While RIDEM was reviewing NETC's proposed contract,
NORTHNAVFACENGCOM was considering alternatives to the standard
competitively awarded contract procedures. As stated earlier,
because of the strong possibility of a delayed award, the
allotted $2,000,000 for the project was in jeopardy of being
lost. Representatives from NORTHNAVFACENGCOM visited the Army
Corps of Engineers (ACE) and requested that the Tank closure work
to be completed under ACE's "PRE-PLACED REMEDIAL ACTION
CONTRACT."m It was concluded from the meeting with ACE that
using the ACE "pre-placed remedial action contract" would insure
a contract award in fiscal year 1990. 71
Because of the overrUling by USEPA concerning groundwater/soil
remediation, RIDEM felt obligated to have NETC amend its contract
NETC, Newport ltr. ser. #123424E dtd.6 June 1990.
m NORTHNAVFACENGCOM ltr. ser. #7569/1412/BJH dtd. 6 June
1990 and internal trip report memo dtd. 7 June 1990.
71
1990.
NETC, Newport (internal code 424E) memo dtd. 7 June
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once again. RIDEM called for the inclusion of the installation
of additional groundwater monitoring wells and sampling to
determine the extent of groundwater and soil contamination. This
would facilitate EPA's wish to delay any groundwater/soil
remediation until the extent of the groundwater problem was known
(Phase II: Initial Assessment study). By August 1990 NETC had
amended the proposed contract and submitted the final plan and
revised tank closure time table to RIDEM for review. n
In september 1990 the contract was awarded to OHM Corporation of
Hopkinton, Massachusetts. Work on the project was delayed due to
the winter and the contractor proposed a tentative start date of
1 April 1991. n In addition to the new contractor delay, the
completion of the Tank closure would suffer a further delay
because of funding constraints. It was discovered in October
1990 after awarding the contract that there would only be enough
money for removal and disposal of the tank's contents, and
cleaning of the tank walls. The final task in closing the tanks
which was the demolition phase was then postponed by NETC and
NORTHNAVFACENGCOM to fiscal year 1991 and would be awarded under
a separate contract.~
From NETC's perspective, they were addressing the same problem
n NETC, Newport ltr. sere #210/424E dtd. 23 August 1990.
n NETC, Newport ltr. sere #240/424E dtd. 16 October 1990.
~ NETC, Newport ltr. sere #251/424E dtd.30 October 1990.
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from two angles and in effect had two agencies to deal with. It
was not certain that remedial processes and techniques perfected
by NETC during the remediation of Tanks 53 and 56 under RIDEM
would be accepted by USEPA for the eventual trasferrence in
remediating the other tanks in tank farms 4 and 5. In fact,
USEPA is currently pressuring NETC to study and practice other
techniques to clean the ballast water and ground water in and
around the other tanks.
BecaUse two different governmental agencies (RIDEM and USEPA)
have managed different aspects of the remediation process,
conflicts of appropriate remediation procedures and schedules for
remediation have resulted. As 1991 drew to a close it became
evident that NETC was once again falling behind on their closure
schedule for Tanks 53 and 56. From a management perspective the
problem was that while the investigation of all tanks under
CERCLA progressed, the immediate project on Tanks 53 and 56 was
deemphasized by NETC. In fairness to NETC it is easier to deal
with one schedule vice two. The more that the investigation
under CERCLA progressed, the further behind NETC became with the
specific closure schedule pertaining to Tanks 53 and 56.
In November 1991 EPA was provided the "DRAFT FINAL PHASE I
REMEDIAL INVESTIGATION REPORT - NETC" which confirmed
contamination throughout Tank Farm Five. EPA determined that
additional information would be necessary to adequately
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characterize the horizontal and vertical extent of soil and
ground water contamination at this site. The additional work
would be addressed in NETC's Phase II RI Work Plan under CERCLA.
since the ground water around Tanks 53 and 56 was affected by
tanks throughout Tank farm 5, the EPA took over management of the
ground water remediation issue under CERCLA. The closure of
Tanks 53 and 56 was slowed because of the complications of
coordinating activities between two agencies. At a meeting
between EPA and RIDEM in December 1991, EPA approved the state's
decision to proceed with the closure activities under RCRA with
the exception of the ground water portion. 7s That meant that the
demolition and back filling of the tanks could go forward before
ground water/soil remediation. However, as will be described
later, EPA's approval to go ahead with the demolition was short
lived.
On 5 February 1992 NETC submitted a revised closure schedule and
requested an extension (180 days) be granted to allow for
completion of the closure of Tanks 53 and 56 by 15 October 1992.
However, the plan called for completion of ground water/soil
remediation prior to any demolition of the tanks. NETC knew that
the ground water remediation of the entire Tank Farm was now
under the purview of the EPA. NETC also knew that the ground
water remediation under CERCLA would not be completed by 15 OCT
7S united states Environmental Protection Agency (USEPA)
Region 1 ltr. dtd. 3 February 1992.
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(it would in fact take years) and would therefore further delay
the demolition of Tanks 53 and 56. 76 By submitting the extension
request in this manner NETC was attempting to slow the RIDEM
schedule so that it would be overtaken by the EPA Superfund
schedule. RIDEM would in effect be forced out of the picture and
as a result NETC would only need to deal with only one agency.
RIDEM responded to NETC's request for extension in March 1992.
RIDEM approved the extension but stipulated several conditions to
NETC for the revised closure plan as follows: n
(a) That the Tanks be demolished in conjunction with or
shortly after soil remediation and that sampling under
the tank floors for soil contamination be addressed in
the plan.
(b) The schedule in the plan is not acceptable because of
the long delay. A new schedule must be submitted
within 30 days.
(c) NETC must enter into a Consent Agreement with RIDEM.
The Consent Agreement will include the revised schedule
approved by RIDEM with stipulated penalties should this
schedule not be complied with.
NORTHNAVFACENGCOM argued against RIDEM's requirement to demolish
Tanks 53 and 56 in conjunction with soil remediation for the
76
n
NETC, Newport Itr. sera #903/40E dtd.12 February 1992.
RIDEM Itr. dtd. 17 March 1992.
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following reasons: n
(a) If demolition begins during groundwater remediation, it
is likely that this would seriously effect groundwater
flow in the tank farm. Altering the groundwater flow
will likely adversely effect the effectiveness of the
remediation system (expected to be a pump and treat
system). The result would be a delay in achieving
cleanup of the aquifer.
(b) As stated before, demolition while the groundwater is
still contaminated would result in contamination of the
insides of the tank and the back fill material.
Although RIDEM and USEPA have stated that they would
not require remediation of the back fill, it is
difficult to justify cleaning up the area around the
tanks while ignoring contamination of the back fill
within the tanks.
(c) Demolition of the tank in 1993 vs. 1994 would not
provide additional protection of the environment. On
the contrary, the environment would be better protected
by delaying demolition. The Navy fully intends to
carry out demolition, but we feel that delaying
demolition is more prudent.
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May 1992.
NORTHNAVFACENGCOM memo (internal code 1812/BJH) dtd. 6
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RIDEM backed off from their requirement for sampling through the
floor of each tank. On the demolition issue, RIDEM compromised
recommending the Navy to begin contracting arrangements so that
once the additional information on the extent of the
contamination is obtained and ground water remediation is
completed, the Navy can instruct their contractor to commence
with the tank demolition and back filling. 79 (Ltr dtd 18 May
1992 Fm: RIDEM Division of HazMat)
The present physical status of Tanks 53 and 56 is that they have
been emptied, steam cleaned, and remain intact and in place.
Awarding of a contract is expected in fiscal year 1993 assuming
funding is available through the Navy's Defense Environmental
Restoration Account (DERA).
~ RIDEM Division of Air and HazMat ltr. dtd. 18 May 1992.
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CHAPI'ER1j
CONCLUSION
ANALYSIS OF THE PROBLEM Several problems have been identified
which have the potential to repeat themselves at navy bases
throughout the country. We know that similar problems will arise
because we as a nation and more specifically our navy has
historically disposed of wastes aboard our bases without
knowledge of the future consequences. Fuel depots, underground
storage tanks, and transfer facilities are common aboard many
navy bases. There close proximity to populated coastal zones and
food chains increases the danger to human health.
In this case, training was a problem in the initial stages
causing cleanup matters to be continually delayed. Employees and
base military personnel were ignorant of the environmental laws,
and of potential liability both personal and corporate. There
was no base plan of action expressed to the troops. Even more
importantly, although upper management eventually began to focus
on the environmental problem on base, the new attitude was not
impressed upon subordinates early on in the process. The base
continually found itself in a catch up mode as far as hazardous
waste procedures went because of the time lag between the initial
awareness of the problem and the eventual proper training, tools,
and expertise.
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NETC never established a plan of action in the early stages.
They continually found themselves in a reactionary mode having to
respond to regulatory mandates. The base had a defacto goal
however, to put off the inevitable for as long as possible. By
that I mean, necessary investments were not made in proper
funding and adequate personnel manning of the environmental
office on the base until very late in the game. The base went
about its normal business and took on this new environmental
problem as if it were a thorn in its foot. Minimal effort was
put into its solution.
A lackadaisical attitude was pervasive throughout the base and
throughout the navy up through the mid 80s. That attitude
originally condoned and allowed by upper management, later tied
management's hands when it eventually desired a change. As with
any large organization when a change is attempted, it is usually
succeeded only after several fits and starts. In other words,
when upper management finally decided to move in earnest on the
problem it took years to change the lackadaisical environmental
attitudes and behaviors of its employees and military personnel.
Even the outside civilian contractors were slow to move in cases
requiring fast action such as when an oil spill at Tank 53 was
observed in progress and no report was made until the next day.
Breaking the above generalities down more specifically, I
categorize them as follows: 1, poor attitude, or no incentive on
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the part of the navy to change; 2, lack of funding; and 3, lack
of trained personnel.
There were several other problems encountered with all parties
concerned including technical, interpersonal, and cross
organizational. However, I feel these additional problems could
have been solved sooner or avoided altogether had the above three
cited problems received more attention early on.
These additional problems stem from the fact that the navy was
dealing with two major governmental agencies to solve several
environmental problems at once. EPA superfund goals and RIDEM
RCRA goals were at odds at times. Sometimes it was felt a
solution for one site would adversely impact other sites. And
sometimes the EPA and RIDEM would disagree on the best
remediating process or sequence of actions to take for a
particular site. At other times either RIDEM or EPA would change
their position as time passed during the cleanup process.
complicating the matter further was that RIDEM and USEPA were
unfamiliar at implementing the relatively new regulations. In a
gesture of good faith, they gave the navy a relatively free hand
with schedules and solutions. RIDEM discovered to its dismay
that it had given the navy too much free rein. The navy in
essence squandered away time given it by RIDEM. It was not until
RIDEM began to lower the regulatory hammer that NETC began to
move on the problem. RIDEM and EPA were also on the learning
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curve concerning the best technical solutions and they were not
always in agreement between themselves on the best course of
action.
RECOMMENDATIONS
One has to remember that even with the best of intentions,
problems will arise which were not encountered in previous
cleanup evolutions. Although RIDEM and USEPA were in the
cooperation and assistance mode in the early stages of the
cleanup process, the navy was caught unprepared to take action.
All the best technical solutions and organizational agreements
will be for nought if all parties to the cleanup problem do not
have the proper attitude. A proper attitude can be fostered
through several avenues. Although attitudes cannot be regulated,
consequences of decisions can be. After standard policies are in
place then training is in order to heighten awareness in both
negative and positive consequences of environmental decisions.
Once enough people in an organization (about 10% - 20%) are on
board with a new program then the entire attitude of the
organization changes. The navy refers to this as "command
climate." This is the real key in changing attitudes.
In this case the navy's command climate was found lacking. with
a large organization such as the Navy, the process must be
started with a blitz of actions on several fronts. I propose a
simultaneous "Hammer" Front, "Carrot" Front, and "Training" Front
attack on all government personnel on base. Specifics of this
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plan are described below.
HAMMER FRONT ATTACK Personal and organizational liability need
to made clear to the navy and enforced by regulatory agencies.
Enough laws are on the books already in this regard. Many
environmental crimes penalize actions without specific criminal
intent. For example, someone who knows that waste contains a
noxious chemical and disposes of it without determining the
proper way to do so may be convicted of illegally disposing of
hazardous waste. It is not necessary that the individual
specifically know ahead of time that the waste is one listed by
EPA as a hazardous waste or that the method of disposal is
forbidden. Because violation of many environmental laws· threaten
health and safety, the law imposes a burden on those who deal
with potentially hazardous substances to find out the right way
to handle and dispose of them. Other statutes, such as the Clean
Water Act, criminalize actions that are simply negligent.
Failing to use reasonable care can amount to a crime if an
illegal discharge results. there are also a few statutes that
apply strict liability - punishing certain actions without a
showing that the actor was negligent or had criminal intent.
What needs to happen is for the EPA and state agencies to carry
out a few enforcement actions in terms of jail and personal
fines, and organizational fines for the most notorious abusers.
Then the Chief of Naval operations (CNO) needs to put out the
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word to all his commanders for dissemination. In addition, the
CNO should set a policy that requires the local command to bear
the cost of regulatory fines and penalties as appropriate
following an internal investigation. Fines from events that are
beyond the control of the local command would be born by the navy
as a whole, or affixed to the appropriate command within the
navy. Although regulatory agencies may not necessarily always
resort to personal liability, the navy should explore this option
in each of its internal investigations. The navy maintains
strict accountability with regards to its sea commands. "Acts of
God" concerning accidents at sea are few and far between. As in
sea commands, although the navy may compensate an injured 3rd
party, it often exercises the option to discipline the
responsible navy personnel.
The recent conviction and imprisonment of a senior civilian
manager of a fuel farm for discharge of nearly 500,000 gallons8o
of fuel oil into the tundra and water, as well as the prospect of
a stepped up enforcement effort by EPA, demonstrates the
viability of this option.
CARROT FRONT ATTACK The navy needs to provide incentives to help
change attitudes. Environmental excellence should be rewarded.
The status of environmental offices and personnel within these
80 Chief of Naval Operations (CNO) radio message date/time
251435Z august 1992.
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offices should be elevated at all commands throughout the navy.
New ideas and solutions should be recognized with both citations
and monetary rewards. The navy currently has a "Beneficial
Suggestion" program in which people are rewarded for there money
saving ideas by receiving a portion of the savings which their
plan would generate. The program is used with success in several
areas throughout the navy. An advertising and training campaign
are needed to heighten awareness of the application of the
program.
TRAINING FRONT ATTACK The navy knows the value of training to
increase technical proficiency. Our edge as a military force has
been attributed to our well trained personnel. However, when it
comes to investing in changing attitudes, navy training is
usually short lived and is only done in response to an immediate
problem. The problem with this is that attitudes don't change
over night. A serious investment needs to be made to beef up
base environmental offices. Not just in terms of environmental
engineers, but in terms of a cadre of new and permanent trainers
dedicated to a continuing training program. A one time shot in
the arm would do more harm than good. The navy has unfortunately
taken a one time training and forget approach to past internal
attitudinal problems. The problem usually turns out to be more
serious and deeper than most wanted to admit. And once the heat
is off, its back to business as usual. In addition to awareness
training which contributes to a positive attitude, the navy also
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needs to apply the tried and true technical training as well.
FUNDING To make all of the above happen the process has to be
adequately funded. In addition to technical problems, tank
closure delays were encountered because of funding shortages.
The navy needs to realistically plan and budget for hazardous
waste cleanup projects. This "hidden environmental cost" of
doing business has only recently been accepted as a legitimate
expense. In fact in this era of cutbacks, the environmental
budget in terms of hiring environmental engineers is the only
area of personnel expansion in the navy today. However, the
account has to be increased to fund a project through to
completion. The navy needs to beef up the financial viability of
its Defense Environmental Restoration Account (DERA). As
happened too often in this case, delays were caused when one
portion of the project was complete but funds were then lacking
to start on the next phase. In addition to these obvious funding
requirements, a training budget needs to be established. This is
critical because so many times as unfortunately happens in the
navy, a training deficiency is recognized and a knee jerk order
goes out to all navy commands to train its personnel to correct
the problem. In many cases this is equivalent to the "blind
leading the blind" because there is no clear direction; only the
very initial stages of training are conducted using the base's
own funds squeezed from other on board programs. When these
funds run out and the heat is off the training stops. A
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comprehensive program throughout the country which builds from
awareness raising to technical expertise as required is non
existent.
Training links all of the above solutions; however, without a
large funding infusion in the early stages and a smaller but
steady allotment to follow, nothing will change. The
environmental office on each base should be the first to get
beefed up. After the command establishes its environmental goals
then the on base environmental experts should move out and take
charge training the rest of the base, and if necessary hire
outside companies to augment the training.
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GLOSSARY
Activated carbon: A carbonaceous material used to remove
unwanted chemicals from waters and air through adsorption.
Air stripping system: Air stripping removes volatile materials
from water by passing air through the water. The basic concept
in air stripping is to bring the contaminated water into intimate
contact with air to facilitate a phase change in the volatile
compounds from liquid phase to vapor phase. The air will then
carry away the contaminant compound.
Aquifer: A layer of rock or soil that can supply usable
quantities of ground water to wells and springs. Aquifers can be
a source of drinking water and provide water for other uses as
well.
Backwash: To clean a filter by forcing water through it in the
direction opposite to normal flow.
Base/neutral/acids extractable compounds (BNAs): (also called
semivolatiles) A class of compounds typically investigated for
at sites containing petroleum products.
Bedrock: The layer of rock located below the glacially deposited
soil and rock under the ground's surface. Bedrock can be either
solid or fractured (cracked); fractured bedrock can support
aquifers.
coagulation: A process by which dissolved/suspended materials in
a liquid join together to form larger particles capable of
precipitating out of the solution.
Chlorinated and aromatic hydrocarbons: Chlorinated hydrocarbon
is an organic compound containing one or more chlorine groups.
Aromatic hydrocarbons is a class of unsaturated cyclic organic
compounds containing one or more ring structures. The name
aromatic is derived by the distinctive and often fragrant odors
of these compounds.
Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability
Act (CERCLA): A Federal law passed in 1980 and modified in 1986
by the Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization Act (SARA). The
act created a special tax that goes into a Trust Fund, commonly
known as superfund, to investigate and clean up abandoned or
uncontrolled hazardous waste sites. Under the program, USEPA can
either: (1) pay for site cleanup when parties responsible for the
contamination cannot be located or are unwilling or unable to
perform the work or (2) take legal action to force parties
responsible for site contamination to clean up the site or pay
back the Federal government for the cost of the cleanup.
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Defense Environmental Restoration Account (DERA): Is an account
containing funds appropriated by Congress to be used to fund the
investigation and clean up of past hazardous chemical releases at
Department of Defense (DOD) sites.
Effluent: Waste water (treated or untreated) that flow out of a
treatment plant, sewer, or industrial outfall.
Feasibility study (FS) Report: Report that summarizes the
development and analysis of remedial alternatives.
Piltration: separation of suspended solids during waste water
treatment by passing the water through a porous medium such as
sand.
Geophysical: Relating to the science of the utilization of
experimental physics to collect and interpret data regarding
geological phenomena. Practical application of geophysical
methods are typically used to find areas of chemical soil
contamination, buried drums etc.
Ground water: Water found beneath the earth's surface that fills
pores in soil and cracks in bedrock to the point of saturation.
Ground water may transport substances which have percolated
downward from the ground surface as it flows toward its point of
discharge.
Hydrocarbons: Compounds which are composed of hydrogen and
carbon atoms.
Interim Remedial Action: An option evaluated to address the
source or migration of contaminants at a Superfund site to
control or prevent further migration. This action is not
intended to be the final remedy for the site, but must be
consistent with the ultimate remedy chosen.
Management of Migration: An option evaluated to control or
prevent movement or spreading of contaminants in ground water.
National oil and Hazardous Substances contingency Plan (NCP):
The federal regulation that guides determination of the sites to
be corrected under the Superfund program and the program to
prevent or control spills into surface waters or other portions
of the environment.
National Priorities List (NPL): USEPA's list used to prioritize
uncontrolled or abandoned hazardous waste sites identified for
possible long-term remedial action under Superfund.
100
oxidant: A substance containing oxygen that removes electrons,
or oxidizes, another sUbstance, changing its form. When
dissolved iron is oxidized, for example, it changes to a more
insoluble form.
Plume: A three dimensional zone within ground water that
contains contaminants and generally moves in the direction of,
and with, ground water flow.
Record of Decision (ROD): A pUblic document that explains the
cleanup alternative to be used at a NPL site. The ROD is based
on information and technical analysis generated during the RI/FS
and on consideration of the pUblic comments and community
concerns in the Responsiveness Summary.
Remedial Investiqation (RI): The RI determines the nature and
extent and composition of contamination at a hazardous waste
site, and directs the types of cleanup option that are developed
in the FS.
Toxicity Characteristic Leachinq Procedure (TCLP): A test used
to determine the mobility of organic and inorganic analytes
present in waste. The results are used to determine disposal
requirements for the waste.
Ultraviolet (UV)/oxidation: Water treatment process in which
organic contaminants are permanently destroyed by an oxidant
(such as hydrogen peroxide) in the presence of UV light.
upqradient Recharqe: The processes by which water is added to
the zone of saturation upgradient of the source, either directly
into a formation, or indirectly by way of another formation.
Upgradient means in the direction from which ground water flows.
Volatile orqanic Compound (VOC): A group of chemical compounds
composed primarily of carbon and hydrogen that are characterized
by their tendency to evaporate (or volitize) into the air from
water or soil. VOC's include SUbstances that are contained in
common solvents and cleaning fluids. Some VOCs are believed to
cause cancer.
Water table: The upper surface of a zone of saturation except
where that surface is formed by an impermeable body. It is the
level to which a well screened in the unconfined aquifer would
fill with water.
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Source:
APPENDIX
GROUND WATER SAMPLE RESULTS AND AREA CHARTS
TRC Environmental Consultants, Inc. East Hartford, CT.
Appendix D of Tank Closure Investigation Report of
Tanks 53 and 56, Tank Farm Five, NETC, Newport, RIi
June 1991.
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TABLE 1
SAMPLE ANALYSES SUMMARY
TANK FARM 5
NAVAL EDUCATION TRAINING CENTER
NEWPORT, RHODE ISLAND
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TABLE 1
SAMPLE ANALYSES SUMMARY
TANK FARM 5
NAVAL EDUCATION TRAINING CENTER
NEWPORT, RHODE ISLAND
(continued)
(July, 1QQO)
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MW-7
MW-10
RW-1
t.lW-63E
t.lW-53W
t.lW-6eE
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t.lW-a&-1
MW-a&-2
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TABLE 2
SURFACE SOIL SAMPLE DESCRIPTIONS
TANK FARM 5
NAVAL EDUCATION TRAINING CENTER
NEWPORT, RHODE ISLAND
,/ SAMPLE : , . .. ...
...
.,: .
..... : '~",. > .
, NUMBER DATE ANALYSES .. ... SOIL DESCRIPTION
,
55-53 6/14190 TP.H, LEAD SILT. SOME SAND, LITTLE GRAVEL, BROWN
"DUPLICATE SAMPLE (55-61) TAKEN
55-530 6/14190 TPH, LEAD SfLT, UTTlE CLAY, SOME SHALE FRAGMENTS,
, BROWN
55-·56 5110190 VOA, BNA, PEST/PCB,INORG, TPH SILT. SOME FINE-COARSE SAND, UTTlE GRAVEL.
,
BROWN
55-56D 6/14/90 TPH, LEAD SILT, SOME FINE-COARSE SAND. LITTlE GRAVEL.
I BROWN
NOTES: D - INDICATES A DISCRETE SAMPLE
TABLE 3
BOREHOLE DEPTHS AND WELL CONSTRUCTION DETAILS
TANK PARM 5
NAVAL EDUCATION TRAINING CENTER
NEWPORT I RHODE ISLAND
Land surface elevation 69.04 66.59 78.94 80.84 68.59
(ftmlw) 1
Total boring depth 45.0 46.7 43.0 42.0 45.0
(ftbg) 2
Depth to top of 40 21 26 20 33
weathered rock
(ftbg)2
Depth to top of 33.5 33
competent rock
(ftbg) 2
Depth to bottom of well 45.0 45.0 37.4 36.0 45.0
(ftbg) 2
Depth to top of screen 25.0 25.0 17.4 16.0 25.0
(ftbg) 2
Depth to top of sand 22.5 22.0 15.4 14.0 22.0
pack (ftbg) 2
Depth to top of 2.5 20.0 12.4 12.0 20.0
bentonite seal
(ftbg) 2
Top of casing elevation 71.81 69.81 82.26 83.53 72.52(ftmlw) 1
1 Peet above mean low water
2 Feet below grade
Depth of well construction measurements are accurate to the nearest 0.5 feet.
TABLE 4
SUMMARY OF WATER LEVEL MEASOREMENTS AND
ELEVATIONS IN MONITOR WELLS
TANK FARM 5
40.70· 30.40·
36.60· 31. 90·
38.89 32.96
>47.90 <21. 59
34.88 27.78
>28.24 <27.82
39.21 32.91
Tank 53
MW-53E
MW-53W
MW-7
MW-8
MW-86-2
MW-86-4
MW-86-5
RW-1
Tank 56
,,( .
MW-56E
MW-56W
MW-9
MW-10
MW-86-1
71.16
68.50
71:85
69.49
60.54
62.66
56.06
72.12
90.39
86.97
82.27
83.53
90.45
35.16·
32.82·
25.78
30.12
>28.24
30.92
27.32
25.37
36.00·
35.70·
34.76
32.54
<27.82
59.47.
59.65
65.08
34.06
31.89
25.93
27.93
33.10
56.33
55.08
56.34
55.60
57.35
Other Tank Farm 5 Wells
MW-1 33.97 17.10 16.87
MW-2 42.83 13.43 29.40
MW-3 50.08 12.30 37.78
MW-4 52.89 32.03 20.86
MW-5 77 .37 19.16 58.21
MW-6 75.33 9.20 66.13
•
1
2
Approximate due to the presence of free product.
Feet below top of casing.
Feet above mean low water.
TABLE 5
SUMMARY OF GROUND WATER SAMPLE RESULTS
EXCEEDING DEVELOPED ACTION LEVELS
TANK FARM 5
NAVAL EDUCATION TRAINING CENTER
NEWPORT, RHODE ISLAND
Page 1 of 2
YQM
Vinyl Chloride KW-53E 2 22 (F)
RW-l 27
1,2 Dichloroethene KW-7 140/1405 702• (F)
(total)
1, 1, I-Trichloroethane KW-53E 690 2002 (F)
Trichloroethene KW-7 6/65 52 (F)
KW-53E 460
RW-l 5
KW-86-2 8
Tetrachloroethene KW-53E 33 52 (F)
Benzene KW-7 16/155 52 (F)
KW-53E 200
RW-1 18
Toluene KW-53E 100 40 3 (F)
Ethylbenzene KW-53E 150 303 (F)
Xylene KW-53E 430 20 3 (F)
INORGANICS
Arsenic KW-56W 62.5 504 (F)
KW-86-1 159
KW-86-2 51.6
Nickel KW-56W 138 1002 (T)
KW-86-1 250
KW-86-2 134
TABLE 5
SUMMARY OF GROUNDWATER SAMPLE RESULTS
EXCEEDING DEVELOPED ACTION LEVELS
TANK FARM 5
NAVAL EDUCATION TRAINING CENTER
NEWPORT, RHODE ISLAND
Page 2 of 2
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INORCV.NICS
Lead KW-7
KW-9
KW-10
KW-56E
KW-S6W
RW-1
KW-86-1
KW-86-2
31. 6/32 5
5.8
11.4
35.6
25.2
7
48.6
36.2
I
(P)
(1) The most stringent Federal standard or criteria is listed as the action
level.
(2) The Federal Maximum Contaminant Level (MCL).
(3) A secondary Federal Drinking Water Standard based on organoleptic data
(i.e., taste and odor).
(4) The National Interim Primary Drinking Water Regulation (NIPDWR).
(5) Duplicate samples collected at this location.
(F) - Final
(P) - Proposed
(T) - Tentative
* - The action level for 1,2-Dichloroethene is based on cis-l,2-
Dichloroethene and not 1,2-Dichloroethene (total).
./
FIGURES
5
I
SITE
, LOCATION f
\-
\l)
2
:z
o
::L
«
en
SCALE IN MILES
o
•
%
~
:;)
0
:I
'"~ 0cr
0 ZA.
NEWPORT ~
-1
NAVAL en
0
COMPLEX
:z
c=:
.
'i...J(/)
.... ;\
::>
u .::> ,
-
0
z
c:1 ~
Z
0 6u
NARRAGANSETT
BAY
TiC
Environmental
I Con_sultants
800 Conn~c~·:;,,· gv:..e\·l·~
East "'ar~~c!'c. :c~ ... ~:· c~: 06'C~
NAVAL EDUCATION TRAINING CENTER NEWPORT. RI
SOURCE: INITIAL ASSESSMENT STUDY
IENVIRODYNE, 1983)
F'IGURE 1.
NAVAL EDUCATION AND
TRAINING CENTER VICINITY MAP
I
J
/'
NARRAGANSETT
SA'r"
I
I
LEGEND
,
......
f~\
\ /
1
1
'I
x----x FENCE LINE
- - - PROPERTY BOUNDARY & FENCE LINE
,,-
\ ) UNDERGROUND STORAGE TANK
-
c:J BUILDING
TiC
TRC ErMronmentol Consu/fants, Inc.
SCALE
800 (;QnnKI'cul Boultvard
e.ll H.rt'ord. ConnKlICUI 0610;
(:xlJ I 289·!!6J'
NAVAL EDUCATION TRAINING CENTER
FIGURE 2.
NEWPORT. RI
TANK FARM FIVE SITE MAP
..........
<i'<>
"B ""-"-1 ,
-~J
""-5.e
~
-0 I J
o
_
~oo~ \f/~1~OO
)( ~ ~~
8 I1W-,,- 4
Lull
lI)
2:
lLJ
L....
Lt.J
a
o
Il')
>-
'«
en
t
t.J
III
::z:
'«
CI
'«
0:
0:
'«
Z
TiC
TIC L;;.~;'~...;;;.;;;,.;;;••;u1"CC:_;;;;;"""""'.;;;;~"';.:----
100 0
~iilC U -.dfJIi '.-~
50
100 200 JOO 400 FeET
. - - .._:-_1 w... _._. --I "J
_~.~- _.... _-. _._..._--J"" 'td555 *,
o 50 100 METERS
LEGEND
IIW-"-4
8 IoIONITO" MU
110O ~ecUw' II _4.
£eo' Howt.... Cl ."', ~••
(203) 2"-1131
NAVAL EOUCAnON TRAINING CENTER, NE\wORT, RI
lANK FARM FIVE
FIGURE J.
~TE MAP - TANKS 53 AND 56
(SHOWING MONI TOR WELLS IN STALLED
DURING PREVIOUS INVESTIGATIONS)
---
6111'... 84-1
<Po
.._-~\-
~~---'=.----._.---.'__' __ 90
-0 I J o 0
'300
t\ \6\'300
X t '3'3
8 "w.·••-.
la
(
0 1,
I()
,l..!.J
<.n
I!Z
l..!.J
\;-\\~
v-~
<)
C\
-:e
<)
>-
~
Q)
l:
L.J
Vl
Z
~
l)
~
a::
a::
~
z
NAVAL £OUCAnON TRAINING CENTER. NE'IoPOR1, HI
TANK FARM fiVE
FIGURE 4.
MONITOR WELL LOC/\ liON MAP
100
b:J-g
~.
50
o
L.J
L.......a
100 200 300 400 FLLT
.__ 1..· L !
__~_h_' __ - - "_.._ _., - r' is &iiriWFiPiM
I
o 50 100 MUU?S
LEGEND
....-M-.
8 \.lONI lOR WELL
11"-' H RECOVERY M:LL
TfC_-:-:--,---_.
TllC f_toI (_,,,,,-,,.....
100 c...n.ctlalll ~ ....
[ •• , ......,ot.l Ct Deice
('OJ) ,.. -- LUI
.0
0
----. ..
--~-I
/(
-F --------.: ----.
----- -----
_ 90
o 01==
q"pO~ \0 ~~oo,~t- "J"J
Lu
U"}
Z
Lu
G..
Lu
a
o
lI"l
)...
'<{
co
l-
I-
L.J
lI)
Z
'<{
l.:l
~
lr
'<{
Z
100 100 c..n~tlo.,;( • .,•.
( ..t He"""''' r.r 01101
__ J2~J)2!' ")1
TiC
nc f..... _0aI C-.II.oto. ....
--"- .-.-._.- -- ------_ ...
NAVAL EDUCAnON TRAINING CENTER, NEWPOIH, III
TANK fA~M FWE
LEGEND
a 100 200 300 400 FEU
~ '1£3. uJ-·=-_:.-::-.:-~~·._ ,J .._-- \- I
F"" L;U -_.~ ---. . .-- - ---r *. "'1
50 0 50 100 MUfRS
NOTE: One compo"lI. IUffoe. Ion lample _01 olio
collKI.d from loch tonk aria.
55 ~JD
•
DISCRETE SOIL
SAI.IPlE LOCA nON
FIGURE 5.
SURFACE SOIL SAMPLl L.OCATlm~ MAl:>
"\2.:)
~ MW-6
(66.13)
...... ,
I
I
NARRAGANSETT
BAY
LEGEND o 600 FT1E:;;;;~r:::::==:E:::::=l-1
FIGURE 6.
GROUND WATER LEVEL
CONTOUR MAP·· TANK FARM FIVE
JULY 17, 1990
NAVAL eDUCATION TRAINING CENHR
x----x FENCE LINE
- - PROPERTY BOUNDARY & FENCE LINE
1-
\ 1 UNDERGROUND STORAGE TANK
-
C::J BUILDING
(~:;~)~ MONITOR WEll LOCATION AND
WATER LEVEL ELEVATION ON 7/17/90 IN
FEET ABOVE MEAN LOW WATER
- -20- GROUND WATER ELEVATION CONTOUR
IN FEET ABOVE MEAN lOW WATER
... DIRECT ON OF GROUND WATER GRADIENT
TiC
TRC Environmental Consultants, Inc.
SCALE
800 ConnectICut Bou1tvard
Eal! I-Ian ford. ConnKl,cul 06' 08
1~31 2S9-8631
NEWPORT. RI
...
--
100 C--Uoul Ill •. '
l ••' ....,.,.... (' o..lM
(2G3) 2"--""
,
. 90'---~
- 'X -,
,
,
J 1l.~~OlJ
60 ----'\""-1'
r "\ ,
'Sb
FIGURE 7.
GROUND WATER LEVEL ELEVA TI ON
CONTOUR MAP _. JULY 17,1990
NAVAL EDUCATION TRAINING CENTER. NEWPORT. III
lANK FARM FIVE
TIC , ......_tal C..................
nc
CENERALIZED CROUND W"T£R
£I tv" nON CON lOUR IN rEET
ADOY[ LA£"N lOW wATl:R
CENERAlIZED OIREClION OF
CROUNO WA IER CRAOIEN I
a UW-"-4
o (J2.S.) LAONITOR WEll lOCAnON
AND WA T£R lEV[l ElE VA 11011
ON 7/17/90 IN FEET "UOV[
I.lEAN lOW WATlR (. DlNOTl:S
WAITR lEvn NOT UnliZED
IN CONTOURINC)
FEET
~
METERS
30-
9 UW-81-4
(J2.~.)
JOO 400
--I d
._,. '.r,e!'e 'S '
SO 100
o
I{)
100 200
--~----... ~-J
-~--------
o
\\~\\ <;>..
\
>-
~
Q)
t
14J
VI
Z
~
l)
~
0:
0:
~
Z
100 ()
b:-_IEiI- - ...J
~ __ r;;;;;....J.
50
-BII~)
"\
~
roo Cenntc1lcut ......
I •• l Hwt,.., C1 01101
(,OJ) ,n-"JI
--~
-~
_-\- ._~90
X -
FIGURE 8.
GROUND WATER LEVEL [LEVA TION
CONTOUR MAP - OCTOIWR 25, 1990
TIC
TllC" .0 'ul e-.-.... ....
NAVAL EDUCAnON TRAINING CENTER, rJEMlORT. RI
TANI< FARM FIVE
o 0 t- _,
00\'i:/~~~:pO~ 'J'J
X t. LEGEND
o IIII'-N-4
"0' (27.711) IoIONITOR I'f{LL LOC... nON
"'ND w"'lIR lEVU ELEV... llON
ON 7/17 /DO IN rEtl ...aOVE
IAl ...N LOW W... TlR (0 DENOl£S
W... lf.R U\/El NOl UllllZED
IN CONTOURING)
GDIER"'lI2ED GROUND W... TrR
HEV... llON CON lOUR IN rEET
ABOV'[ LlE ...N lOW W'" TrR
~ GENER ... lIZED DIREcnON or
~ GROUND WA1ER GRADIENT
M£:'!.RS
30-
400 FEfT
I
,
9I1W-88-4
(27. 711)
I
30
200
It.J
(f)
::2: 11
It.J
lJ..
l.JJ
a
o
It)
700 .Joo
..~... t •li~. b!1iE3E~e.
.__ ._,. wag,
50 100
. ..,~­
o
~
9,
«'
\i>~
<)
~~
>-
~
t
L..J
VI
Z
~
~
a:
~
Z
700 0
~1 MI- •.
fTlI -
50
